UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
DARIUS D. JONES,
Plaintiff,
vs. Case No.: 3:25cv1355/LAC/ZCB
DAVID BRENT BROOKS, et al.,
Defendants.
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff is incarcerated in the Escambia County Jail. He is
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docs. 8, 10).
The Court is required to screen Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc.
10) to determine whether it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (requiring screening of in forma
pauperis complaints); see also Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007)
(recognizing that Congress has mandated “early judicial screening of
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prisoner complaints”). Having screened the amended complaint, the
Court believes dismissal is warranted for failure to state a claim.1
I. Background
Plaintiff’s amended complaint names two Pensacola police officers
as Defendants: David Brent Brooks and Noah Isaac Duford. (Doc. 10 at
1-3). On July 13, 2025, Defendant Brooks arrested Plaintiff for battery
on an officer, resisting an officer with violence, and disorderly conduct.
(Id. at 5). According to Plaintiff, Defendant Brooks failed to advise him
of his Miranda rights. (Id.). Defendant Duford escorted Plaintiff to jail
and also allegedly failed to advise him of his Miranda rights. (Id. at 5-
6). Plaintiff was subsequently charged with the offenses for which he was
arrested. (Id. at 5).
The amended complaint brings two claims. (Id. at 7). First,
Plaintiff claims Defendant Brooks violated the Double Jeopardy Clause
1 The Court previously provided Plaintiff an opportunity to amend after
explaining deficiencies in his prior pleading. (Doc. 9). Nonetheless,
Plaintiff’s amended complaint still includes some of the same pleading
deficiencies. See generally Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th
Cir. 2001) (stating that a plaintiff typically “must be given at least one
chance to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the
action”).
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by arresting him for battery on an officer, resisting an officer with
violence, and disorderly conduct. (Id.). Second, Plaintiff says Defendants
Brooks and Duford failed to advise him of his Miranda rights. (Id. at 7).
As relief, Plaintiff seeks damages. (Id.).
II. Statutory Screening Standard
To survive dismissal at the screening phase, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up).
The plausibility standard is met only where the facts alleged enable “the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility means “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where a
complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s
liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
determination of whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
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Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Miller v. Donald, 541
F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008). But “this leniency does not give a court
license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise
deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air
Jamaica Ltd.,
760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014).
III. Discussion
A. Plaintiff has not stated a plausible double jeopardy
claim against Defendant Brooks.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Brooks violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment2 by charging him with disorderly
conduct, battery on an officer, and resisting arrest. (Doc. 10 at 5). As an
initial matter, the Court is skeptical that a § 1983 action is the
appropriate vehicle for raising a double jeopardy claim. See Freeman v.
2 The Court assumes Plaintiff intended to bring his claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause instead of the Fifth
Amendment given that Defendant Brooks is a state and not a federal
officer. See Jordan v. Mosley, 298 F. App’x 803, 806 n.5 (11th Cir. 2008)
(explaining that the Fifth Amendment applies only to federal officials);
see also Illinois v. Vitale,
447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980) (explaining that the
protections of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause are
“applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment”).
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Fuller, 623 F. Supp. 1224, 1227 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (stating that a double
jeopardy claim “is not really an appropriate basis for a § 1983 claim and
is more properly asserted in the state trial and appellate courts” where
the criminal prosecution is pending or in a petition for habeas corpus).
But assuming arguendo that such a claim can be raised under § 1983,
Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim here. The Double Jeopardy
Clause “prohibits successive prosecutions and multiple punishments. It
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal.
It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same
offense.” United States v. Harvey,
78 F.3d 501, 504 (11th Cir. 1996)
(cleaned up).
Here, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that he is the victim of a
second prosecution after having been previously convicted or acquitted of
the same offense. Nor has he plausibly alleged that he has been punished
multiple times for the same offense. Indeed, Plaintiff has not plausibly
alleged any facts that support his claim that Defendant Brooks has
caused him to be put twice into jeopardy for the same offense. Thus,
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Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Brooks violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause should be dismissed.
B. Defendants’ alleged failure to advise Plaintiff of his
Miranda rights does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.
The amended complaint alleges that Defendants Brooks and
Duford violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by not reading him the
Miranda warnings. This claim fails because a Miranda violation cannot
form the basis of a § 1983 action. See Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134, 152
(2022) (refusing to permit § 1983 claims based on Miranda violations);
see also Jones v. Cannon,
174 F.3d 1271, 1291 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding
that a violation of Miranda does not give rise to a cognizable claim under
§ 1983). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants violated
Miranda should be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:
1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint be DISMISSED for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
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2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.
At Pensacola, Florida this 13th day of November 2025.
/s/ Zachary C. Bolitho
Zachary C. Bolitho
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice to the Parties
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be
filed within fourteen days of the date of the Report and Recommendation.
Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the
Court’s internal use only and does not control. An objecting party must
serve a copy of the objections on all other parties. A party who fails to
object to the magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained
in a report and recommendation waives the right to challenge on appeal
the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal
conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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