Brown v. City Of Chicago

               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                          
               NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS                         
                    EASTERN DIVISION                                 

ARTHUR BROWN,                   )                                         
                           )                                         
          Plaintiff,       )                                         
                           )                                         
     v.                    )    No. 18 C 7064                        
                           )                                         
CITY OF CHICAGO, Kimberly Campbell  )  Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer         
as Special Representative for the Estate of  )                            
JOSEPH CAMPBELL, Diane Romza-Kutz  )                                      
as Special Representative for the Estate of  )                            
DAVID KUTZ, and Frank W. Fine as  )                                       
Special Administrator for the Estate of  )                                
JOSEPH D. FINE, Former Assistant State’s  )                               
Attorney JOEL WHITEHOUSE, and other  )                                    
as-yet unidentified employees of the City of )                            
Chicago,                        )                                         
                           )                                         
          Defendants.      )                                         

             MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                            
The parties’ Daubert motions are before the court.  For the reasons explained here, 
Defendants’ motions to limit the testimony of Dr. Antoinette Kavanaugh, Mr. Dennis Waller and 
Dr. Richard Leo [363, 367, 368], and Plaintiff’s motion to bar the testimony of Dr. Michael Welner 
[366] are granted in part and denied in part.                             
                      BACKGROUND                                     
Plaintiff Arthur Brown spent nearly 30 years in prison for a crime he insists he did not 
commit.  The court assumes familiarity with the facts of this case, which are set forth in its 
summary judgment opinion.  See generally Brown v. City of Chicago, No. 18 C 7064, 

 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2022).  In summary, on May 28, 1988, an arson occurred in a video 
rental store on the south side of Chicago, resulting in the death of two persons who were asleep 
in the restaurant next door.  Mr. Brown was arrested by the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) 
and charged with the arson and murders.  Mr. Brown was convicted of these crimes, but in 2017, 
the Circuit Court of Cook County vacated Mr. Brown’s convictions, and Mr. Brown was released 
from prison.                                                              
Mr. Brown has sued former CPD Detectives Joseph Campbell, Joseph Fine, and David 
Kutz, and former Assistant State’s Attorney Joel Whitehouse.1  Mr. Brown alleges in this lawsuit 
that he is entitled to damages because he was wrongfully convicted and incarcerated due to the 
Defendants’ misconduct.  Specifically, he claims that the investigators fabricated an inculpatory 
statement, which he signed as a result of their coercion, and which was used to convict him.  
Defendants maintain that they did not violate Mr. Brown’s constitutional rights or Illinois law, and 
they deny that Mr. Brown is entitled to any damages.                      
Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, and the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 

 (1993), each party seeks 
to exclude or, in the alternative, to limit expert testimony offered by the opposing party at trial.  
Defendants  seek  to  limit  the testimony  of  three  individuals:  (1)  Dr.  Antoinette  Kavanaugh, 
Mr. Brown’s expert on mental and emotional damages; (2) Mr. Dennis Waller, Mr. Brown’s expert 
on police practices; and (3) Dr. Richard A. Leo, Mr. Brown’s expert on false confessions.  
Mr. Brown seeks to exclude the testimony of Dr. Michael Welner, Defendants’ expert on disputed 
confessions.                                                              
                      DISCUSSION                                     
Trial judges act as gatekeepers to screen expert evidence for relevance and reliability. 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; see also C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 
2015).  Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the court will admit expert opinion testimony if four 
conditions are met: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony 


1    The court refers to these individuals collectively as “Defendants.”  When referring 
to Detectives Campbell, Fine, and Kutz (but not former ASA Whitehouse), the court uses the 
phrase “Detective Defendants.”                                            
is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the 
case.  The expert’s opinion must be based on “knowledge” rather than mere “subjective belief or 
unsupported speculation.”  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590; Brown v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 

 (7th Cir. 2014).  When determining admissibility, the court is not as concerned 
with “the ultimate correctness of the expert’s conclusions” so much as “the soundness and care 
with which the expert arrived at her opinion.”  Burton v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 

, 826 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Schultz v. Akzo Nobel Paints, LLC, 

 
(7th Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).                      
To determine whether an expert passes Daubert muster, the court engages in a three-
step  analysis,  assessing  (1)  the  expert’s  qualifications,  (2)  the  reliability  of  the  expert’s 
methodology, and (3) the relevance of the expert’s testimony.  Anderson v. Raymond Corp., 
No. 22-1872, 

, at *1 (7th Cir. Mar. 2, 2023); see also Gopalratnam v. Hewlett-
Packard Co., 

 (7th Cir. 2017).  The question is not whether the expert is qualified 
in general, but rather whether he or she is qualified to offer a specific opinion.  Gayton v. McCoy, 

 (7th Cir. 2010).  The party offering the expert testimony bears the burden of 
demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence satisfies Rule 702 and 
Daubert.  Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 

 (7th Cir. 2009); Kumho Tire Co., 
Ltd. v. Carmichael, 

 (1999); see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s 
note to 2000 amendment.                                                   
I.   Plaintiff’s Expert Antoinette Kavanaugh                              
A.   Dr. Kavanaugh’s Qualifications                                  
Plaintiff has retained Antoinette Kavanaugh, Ph.D. to offer expert opinions regarding 
Mr. Brown’s mental health and emotional damages.  (See generally Expert Report of Antoinette 
Kavanaugh (“Kavanaugh Report”), Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Bar Pl.’s Expert (“Pl.’s 
Kavanaugh Resp.”) [383-1].)  Dr. Kavanaugh is a clinical psychologist and a board-certified 
forensic psychologist.  (Kavanaugh Report at 1.)  She received her undergraduate degree at 
Bowdoin College, earned her doctoral degree in clinical psychology from Northwestern University 
Medical  School,  and  completed  a  forensic  postdoctoral  fellowship  at  the  University  of 
Massachusetts Medical Center.  (Id.)  She has been in private practice for more than 20 years 
and, on several occasions, has conducted forensic evaluations and provided testimony in criminal 
and civil cases.  (Id.)  Defendants do not challenge Dr. Kavanaugh’s qualifications as an expert 
on mental and emotional damages in general.                               
B.   Dr. Kavanaugh’s Expert Opinion                                  
Dr. Kavanaugh opines that Mr. Brown suffers from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(“PTSD”) caused by his allegedly wrongful conviction and imprisonment.  She also opines that 
Mr. Brown “has yet to psychologically process all that he experienced as a man who suffered 
long-term wrongful incarceration.”  (Id. at 3.)  She remarks that Mr. Brown “will likely have other 
psychological consequences” as he continues to process his experience.  (Id.)  Her expert report 
further  states  that,  “[w]hile  he  currently  suffers  from  PTSD,  over  time  he  may  experience 
symptoms of another disorder such as depression.”  (Id. at 35.)           
C.   Admissibility                                                   
Defendants do not challenge the admissibility of Mr. Brown’s PTSD diagnosis, but they 
argue  that  Dr.  Kavanaugh’s  report  contains  other  improper,  speculative,  and  inflammatory 
opinions that are not reliable or relevant, and thus inadmissible [363].  The court addresses these 
challenges in turn.                                                       
     1.   Future Mental Injuries                                     
Defendants argue that Dr. Kavanaugh should be barred from testifying that, although 
Mr. Brown has not been diagnosed with depression, he may develop a depression disorder in the 
future.  (Id.)  When Defendants questioned Dr. Kavanaugh about the basis of this conclusion at 
her deposition, she testified that she based that opinion on Mr. Brown’s depressed mood.  (Dep. 
of Antoinette Kavanaugh (“Kavanaugh Dep.”), Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Kavanaugh Resp. [383-2] at 238:6–
17.)  When asked if this remark about a future diagnosis was speculative, Dr. Kavanaugh stated: 
“Based upon the data that I have reviewed and knowing the levels of comorbidity, yes, but that’s 
so—I wouldn’t call it speculation.  I would just say that it’s reflective of the data and knowing that 
often PTSD is a comorbid diagnosis.”  (Kavanaugh Dep. at 238:22–239:3.)   
Under Illinois law, evidence of potential future harm is admissible and not speculative so 
long as the increased risk—as opposed to the actual harm—is likely to occur.2  In re Yasmin and 
Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg. Sales Pracs & Prods Liability Litig., No. 3:09–md–02100–DRH–PMF, 

 at *10 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2011).  Mr. Brown contends that Dr. Kavanaugh has 
met this threshold by explaining at her deposition that “often PTSD is a comorbid diagnosis.”  
(Kavanaugh  Dep.  at  238:22–239:3.)    However,  Dr. Kavanaugh  did  not  explain  what  the 
comorbidity rate is, or how likely it is that Mr. Brown specifically faces the risk of a future 
depression diagnosis.  Based on Dr. Kavanaugh’s expert report and deposition testimony, the 
court does not find that Dr. Kavanaugh’s opinion is based on a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty.  Without such a foundation, Dr. Kavanaugh’s opinion that Mr. Brown may suffer 
depression in the future is inadmissible speculation.                     
     2.   Opinion on Actual Innocence                                
Defendants argue that the court should bar Dr. Kavanaugh from offering opinions that Mr. 
Brown is in fact innocent because that is a legal conclusion that will determine the outcome of the 
case.  See Good Shepherd Manor Foundation, Inc. v. City of Momence, 323 F.3d at 557, 564 


2    Plaintiff cites to the legal standard Illinois courts use for awarding damages in 
medical malpractice claims: a plaintiff may recover damages for an increased risk of a future harm 
if it can be shown to a reasonable degree of certainty that the proximate cause of that harm was 
the defendant’s negligence.  The Illinois Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to award 
damages “to the extent that the future harm is likely to occur as measured by multiplying the total 
compensation to which the plaintiff would be entitled if the harm in question were certain to occur 
by the proven probability that the harm in question will in fact occur.”  Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 

, 

 (2002) (citing and adopting a Connecticut civil jury 
instruction).  Assuming this same formula for calculating damages applies in this case, Dr. 
Kavanaugh’s testimony does not provide jurors adequate information for calculating damages on 
Mr. Brown’s future potential depression diagnosis.                        
(7th Cir. 2003) (applying, in a Fair Housing Amendment Act case, the rule that “expert testimony 
as to legal conclusions that will determine the outcome of the case is inadmissible”).  Defendants 
correctly point out that Dr. Kavanaugh’s report and deposition contain statements that are not the 
proper subject of expert testimony, including her belief that, because Mr. Brown received a 
Certificate of Innocence, he is, in fact, innocent.  (Kavanaugh Dep. at 16:22–17:23.)  She may not 
testify regarding the legal significance of Mr. Brown’s Certificate of Innocence to the jury. 
Dr. Kavanaugh is, of course, free to rely on Mr. Brown’s version of events to render her 
opinion.  See Harris v. City of Chicago, No. 14 C 4391, 

, at *13 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 
2017) (collecting authority that an expert may base an opinion on their client’s version of disputed 
facts); Caine v. Burge, No. 11 C 8996, 

, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2013) (same).  
And she may testify to her opinion that Mr. Brown’s damages are exacerbated because he 
believes he has been wrongfully convicted, and that mental distress suffered by individuals who 
believe they have been wrongfully convicted is more severe than for those who do not hold such 
a belief.  (Kavanaugh Report at 34–35.)  In so testifying, Dr. Kavanaugh must abide by a subtle 
but meaningful distinction: she may testify that, if the jury were to credit Mr. Brown’s account, the 
jury could find that he has suffered severe mental and emotional damages; but she may not testify 
that Mr. Brown’s PTSD and risk of depression is evidence that he has in fact been wrongfully 
convicted.                                                                
     3.   Prejudicial Comparisons                                    
Defendants take issue with a portion of Dr. Kavanaugh’s report that Mr. Brown assures 
the court she will not repeat at trial.  The court agrees that the opinions at issue—that Mr. Brown’s 
experience “is akin to trying to survive in a concentration camp or being a civilian prisoner of war” 
(Kavanaugh Report at 2)—are inflammatory and unfairly prejudicial.  In addition, Dr. Kavanaugh 
has not offered a sufficient factual basis for these opinions.  They are therefore inadmissible under 
Rule 402 and 702.                                                         
D.   Summary                                                         
Dr. Kavanaugh may opine on Mr. Brown’s PTSD diagnosis and risk of future harms.  
Absent additional foundation (not presented in her expert report or deposition), she may not testify 
that Mr. Brown faces a future risk of depression.  She may not testify regarding the legal 
significance of Mr. Brown’s Certificate of Innocence, nor will she be permitted to compare 
Mr. Brown’s experience with those of prisoners of war or persons confined in concentration 
camps.                                                                    
II.  Plaintiff’s Expert Dennis Waller                                     
A.   Mr. Waller’s Qualifications                                     
Mr. Brown has retained Mr. Dennis Waller as an expert on police practices.  Mr. Waller 
has served as a police officer, field training officer, detective, sergeant, lieutenant, department 
training officer, and police chief.  (See generally Curriculum Vitae, Ex. A to Expert Report of 
Dennis Waller (“Waller Report”), Ex. 1 to Defs.’ Mot. to Bar Pl.’s Expert (“Defs.’ Waller Br.”) [367-
1].)  Mr. Waller holds a Bachelor of Science degree in police administration from Michigan State 
University and a Master of Science in Public Administration from Florida International University.  
(Waller Report at 1.)  He has participated in over 3,700 hours of law enforcement training.  (Id.)  
He has several law enforcement certifications and has reviewed over 750 cases involving issues 
related  to  police  policies,  procedures,  and  practices.    (Id.)    Defendants  do  not  challenge 
Mr. Waller’s qualification in general as an expert on police practices.   
B.   Mr. Waller’s Expert Opinion                                     
Mr. Waller offers five opinions in his expert report.  First, he opines that the manner in 
which the Detective Defendants conducted their investigation “was inconsistent with CPD training, 
CPD policy, ethical conduct, and nationally accepted standards of police practice.”  (Waller Report 
at 9–18 (Opinion A).)  Second, he states that the CPD officers in this case used interrogation 
tactics that deviated from nationally accepted standards of law enforcement practice.  (Id. at 18–
26 (Opinion B).)  Third, he opines that, crediting Mr. Brown’s version of events, CPD officers and 
former-ASA Whitehouse fabricated the statement used to convict Mr. Brown.  (Id. at 26–28 
(Opinion C).)  Fourth, he concludes that Defendants Campbell, Fine, and Kutz failed to abide by 
their obligation to prevent a violation of Mr. Brown’s constitutional rights.  (Id. at 28–32 (Opinion 
D).)  Fifth, he discusses what he believes are pitfalls in CPD policies and practice.  (Id. at 32–41 
(Opinion E).)  Sixth, he opines that “substantial circumstantial evidence” supports Mr. Brown’s 
contention that he never confessed to the crimes of which he was convicted, so the basis for 
probable cause in his criminal case was manufactured.  (Id. at 41–42 (Opinion F).) 
Mr. Waller’s report describes his methodology for examining police-related issues in 
litigation as follows: (1) developing an understanding of the facts, (2) analyzing the actions of the 
officers, (3) comparing the officers’ actions with training and practice standards, and (4) defining 
and  explaining  consistencies  or  inconsistencies  in  the  officers’  actions  as  compared  with 
applicable standards of training, practice, and professional ethics.  (Id. at 2–3.)   
C.   Admissibility                                                   
Defendants argue that Mr. Waller’s report contains inadmissible testimony regarding 
witness  credibility,  legal  conclusions,  retrospective  critiques  of  the  Detective  Defendants’ 
investigation, and state-of-mind speculations [367].                      
     1.   Credibility and Legal Conclusions                          
Defendants argue that Mr. Waller’s opinions and conclusions about credibility, reliability, 
the law, and Mr. Brown’s innocence should be barred.  The law on this matter is clear.  “It is the 
role of the judge, not an expert witness, to instruct the jury on the applicable principles of law, and 
it is the role of the jury to apply those principles of law to the facts in evidence.”  Jimenez v. City 
of Chicago, 

 (7th Cir. 2013).  “As a general rule, accordingly, an expert may not 
offer legal opinions.”  

  The court agrees with Defendants that Mr. Waller’s report is rife with 
impermissible legal opinions that rest on Mr. Brown’s disputed allegations.  As examples (and 
there are many), Waller may not offer testimony on the following topics:  
•  The legal import of Mr. Brown’s Certificate of Innocence (Waller Report at 15, 
  22);3                                                              
•  Whether Defendants, in fact, coerced Mr. Brown to confess (id. at 26, 28, 30); 
•  Whether CPD detectives violated the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth Amendments and 
  state law (id. at 24–25);                                          
•  Whether “substantial circumstantial evidence” supports Mr. Brown’s contention 
  that he never confessed (id. at 41);                               
•  Whether Mr. Brown’s confession was the primary basis for his conviction (id. 
  at 22);                                                            
•  Whether the Defendants’ actions “constitute malicious prosecution” (id. at 42); 
•  Whether  CPD  practices  “institutionalized  denial  of  due  process  for  the 
  accused” (id. at 21).4                                             
In short, Mr. Waller may not opine on the legal significance of the Defendants’ actions 
because his role is “limited to describing sound professional standards and identifying departures 
from them.”  West v. Waymire, 

, 652 (7th Cir.1997); see also Abdullahi v. City of 
Madison, 

, 772 (7th Cir.2005).  On this point, Mr. Waller’s testimony must remain 
focused  on  policing  practices  and  not mere repetition to  the jury  of Mr.  Brown’s  disputed 
allegations, which alone would do little to assist the jury to understand the evidence.  See United 
States v. Brownlee, 

 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that expert testimony that “parrots” 
out-of-court statements fails to help the jury); Goldberg v. 401 North Wabash Venture LLC, 

 (7th Cir. 2014) (similar).                              

3    Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Waller will not testify on such matters to the jury (Pl.’s 
Waller Resp. [381] at 6 n.4), but it bears repeating: Mr. Waller is not a legal expert, and his 
opinions on the significance of Mr. Brown’s Certificate of Innocence exceed the scope of his 
expertise.  (See Waller Report at 15, 22.)  Such testimony is barred.     

4    Plaintiff assures the court that Mr. Waller will not opine on Monell issues, and the 
court agrees that such opinions are barred:  Mr. Waller will not be permitted to offer testimony 
about CPD policies as presented on pages 28 through 41 of his report.  Relatedly, consistent with 
Plaintiff’s assurances, Mr. Waller will not testify regarding Defendant Whitehouse’s conduct.  (Pl.’s 
Waller Resp. at 14.)                                                      
Both parties point to Andersen v. City of Chicago, 

 (N.D. Ill. 2020), 
where Judge Kendall of this court permitted Mr. Waller to testify within appropriate limitations.  
Andersen is, indeed, instructive.  In that case, Judge Kendall concluded that Waller was qualified 
by his extensive training and experience to opine on police practices generally.  Id. at 813.  So 
too here, Waller may opine on CPD policies and their conformity with nationally accepted police 
standards.  (See, e.g., Waller Report at 9 (“[N]ationally accepted standards of law enforcement 
practice were endorsed by the Chicago Police Department as reflected in its adoption of Rules 
and Regulations, the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics, basic and advanced training, and general 
orders.”).)  He may testify to the steps a reasonable investigator would have taken to solve the 
video store arson and resulting murders, as well as the information that a reasonable investigator 
would have taken into account as the investigation progressed.  See Jimenez, 

.  
As in Andersen, however, there are many topics in Waller’s report that he is not qualified to offer 
opinions on at trial, an exemplary sample of which is laid out above.     
Additionally, while Mr. Waller may reference CPD policies in his testimony, the court notes 
that “[e]vidence of purely localized police procedure is less likely to be helpful than nationally or 
widely used policy.”  United States v. Brown, 

 (7th Cir. 2017).  On this point, 
there is a notable difference between Mr. Waller’s testimony here and the testimony he offered in 
Andersen.  In Andersen, Waller compared the defendant officers’ conduct to CPD policies, but 
did not testify that those policies reflected nationally accepted standards.  Here, in contrast, Mr. 
Waller expressly grounds his opinions on national standards.  Cf. Andersen, 454 F. Supp. 3d at 
820 (“Waller does not explain whether this policy reflected widely accepted standards or the 
standards he used when training officers about interrogations.”).  If Defendants wish to challenge 
the extent to which CPD practices overlap with nationally accepted practices, they may explore 
that  matter  on  cross-examination.    Defendants  are  also  free  to  cross-examine  Mr.  Waller 
concerning generally accepted practices for recording Miranda waivers.  He has not, to date, 
shown that there is any widely-accepted written law enforcement standard concerning this issue 
(Defs.’ Waller Reply [390] at 5), and the court would not be inclined to admit his opinions on the 
issue unless he can do so.                                                
This court concludes, as have other judges in this Circuit, that Mr. Waller may not offer 
legal conclusions, but may “testify about standard criminal investigation procedures from a law 
enforcement officer’s perspective” and describe “how police develop cases against a person of 
interest including how they approach the issue of probable cause.”  Blackmon v. City of Chicago, 
No. 19 C 767, 

, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2022); see also Estate of Robinson v. 
City of Madison, Wisconsin, No. 15-CV-502-JDP, 

, at *9 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 13, 
2017); Avery v. City of Milwaukee, No. 11-C-408, 

, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 20, 
2015); Ott v. City of Milwaukee, No. 09-C-870, 

, at *11 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 17, 
2015); Wells v. City of Chicago, No. 09 C 1198, 

, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2012). 
     2.   Failure to Record and Preserve                             
Defendants argue that Mr. Waller may not opine on the Detective Defendants’ failure to 
preserve notes—testimony that might support a Brady claim—because such a claim will not be 
presented to the jury in this case.  See Brady v. Maryland, 

 (1963) (holding that 
the prosecution’s suppression of evidence from a criminal defendant violates due process “where 
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment”).  In support of this argument, Defendants 
have cited cases holding that, where there is no evidence that exculpatory evidence existed, a 
witness may not speculate that such evidence was suppressed.  (Defs.’ Waller Br. at 8–9 (citing 
Taylor v. City of Chicago, No. 14 C 737, 

, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2019); Hill v. 
City of Chicago, No. 06 C 6772, 

, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. 2009)).)   
Mr. Brown argues that Mr. Waller’s testimony regarding investigation practices is relevant 
to his malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.  Unlike a Brady 
claim, the jury will decide those state law claims, each of which require Mr. Brown to prove the 
Defendants’  acted  with  intent.    Evidence  that  the  Detective  Defendants  deviated  from 
investigatory standards that they knew or should have known existed, Mr. Brown contends, would 
help the jury assess those state-law claims.  Specifically, Mr. Waller opines that the Detective 
Defendants deviated from CPD policy and national norms by failing to record and/or preserve 
notes of the following occurrences (some of which are disputed):  Mr. Brown’s initial denial of 
involvement, his claim that he asked to speak with an attorney, the Detective Defendants’ account 
of a confrontation between Michael Harper and Mr. Brown at Area 1, and any interactions between 
the officers and Mr. Brown while he was in custody but before he gave his statement.  (Waller 
Report at 12–14.)                                                         
The court agrees with Mr. Brown on this point: because such testimony is relevant to the 
intent  elements  of  Mr.  Brown’s  state-law  claims,  Mr.  Waller  may  opine  that  the  Detective 
Defendants failed to record and preserve all relevant information during their investigation, as 
required by CPD policy, training, and generally accepted standards of practice, and Mr. Waller 
may opine that this lack of recordation violated generally accepted practices.  See Blackmon, 

, at *5.                                                   
     3.   Motive Evidence and State-of-Mind Testimony                
Defendants argue that Mr. Waller may not offer testimony that the Detective Defendants 
failed to comply with generally accepted police standards in that they did not follow up on 
Mr. Brown’s alibi witnesses.  The court agrees with Defendants that this testimony is inadmissible 
because there  is  no  evidentiary foundation  for  it.   Waller  has  not  identified  evidence  that 
Mr. Brown, or anyone else, told Defendants about a potential alibi witness (Waller Report at 12), 
and Waller acknowledged at his deposition that a detective would not be required to investigate 
an alibi of which he was not informed.  (Dep. of Dennis Waller (“Waller Dep.”), Ex. 2 to Defs.’ 
Waller Br. [367-2] at 116:11–21, 192:19–193:6.)  Plaintiff has not addressed this aspect of 
Waller’s testimony.  Because such opinions about a purported failure to investigate Brown’s alibi 
would not be supported by sufficient data or facts in the record, they would not help the jury.  
Consequently, Mr. Waller is barred from testifying on the matter.         
     4.   Evidence Regarding Joyce “Honey” Owens                     
Defendants  contend  that  Mr.  Waller’s  opinions  regarding  the  reports  of  Detectives 
Scheithauer and Micek, who are not parties to this case, are inadmissible.  Those reports concern 
the non-party officers’ interview with Joyce “Honey” Owens, who gave a statement the day 
following Mr. Brown’s arrest (a statement that featured several inconsistencies).  Owens reported 
that she and “some other people” were in the store “getting high on cocaine” on the night of the 
fire—and also that she was not inside, but instead stood outside the store while a drug transaction 
occurred within.  She stated that four individuals ran out of the store—and then later stated that 
just one individual ran out of the store, while another person “handed her the packet of cocaine.”  
And she stated that she and other individuals “began to consume the cocaine and discovered it 
was baking soda,” for which “they all blamed Honey for making a switch.”  (See Ex. 9 to Defs.’ 
Mot. in Limine [369-9].)                                                  
In a separate motion in limine, this court ruled that evidence regarding the non-party 
officers’ interview with Ms. Owens is inadmissible.  If used for the truth of Ms. Owen’s statements, 
her statements are hearsay.  If used to show what evidence the Defendants in this case had at 
their disposal when finding probable cause against Mr. Brown, the evidence is of limited probative 
value because the information became available after the Felony Review Unit had already 
approved charges against Mr. Brown. Notably, Mr. Brown's defense attorney was aware of the 
Owens interview in 2008 but chose not to call Owens as a witness and did not ask Detective 
Campbell if he was aware of the report.                                   
 Whatever its use, the court is concerned that the probative value of Ms. Owens’s 
statements would be substantially outweighed by their prejudice to Defendants.  Mr. Waller’s 
opinion does not render these statements admissible.  When remarking on the non-party officers’ 
interview with Ms. Owens, Waller does not cite to any national standard of police practice that 
would require the Defendants in this case to take any further action in response to her statements.  
Mr. Waller’s opinion that the detectives failed to pursue all investigative leads pursuant to CPD 
policy also is not based on sufficient facts or data, because, for one, the interview took place after 
the close of the Detective Defendants’ investigation of Mr. Brown.  There is no evidence that the 
statement was provided to Detective Defendants during their investigation.  Consistent with the 
court’s ruling that reference to the interview of Ms. Owens is inadmissible, Mr. Waller may not 
offer his opinion that investigators should have taken further action in response to her statements. 
D.   Summary                                                         
In sum, Mr. Waller is barred from testifying as to Opinions C, D, E, and F of his expert 
opinion.  He may testify to Opinions A and B in accordance with the limitations set forth above. 
III.  Plaintiff’s Expert Dr. Richard Leo                                  
A.   Dr. Leo’s Qualifications                                        
Mr. Brown has retained Dr. Richard A. Leo as an expert on false confessions.  Dr. Leo 
serves as the Hamill Family Professor of Law and Psychology at the University of San Francisco 
and as a fellow at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law’s Institute for Legal 
Research.  (Curriculum Vitae (“Leo CV”), Ex. A to Expert Report of Richard Leo (“Leo Report”), 
Ex. A to Defs.’ Mot. to Bar Pl.’s Expert (“Defs.’ Leo Br.”) [368-1] at 1.)  Dr. Leo holds a doctoral 
degree in jurisprudence and social policy and a law degree from the University of California, 
Berkeley; a Master of Sociology degree from the University of Chicago; and a Bachelor of Arts 
degree in sociology from the University of California, Berkeley.  (Id. at 2.)  For over 30 years, he 
has conducted research on police interrogation practices as they relate to the psychology of 
interrogation  and  confessions,  including  psychological  coercion,  police-induced  false 
confessions, and erroneous convictions.  (See generally id.)  He has written several books and 
published numerous peer-reviewed articles on the topic of false and unreliable confessions.  (Id. 
at 4–20.)  His work is widely cited by scholars in various fields, and several courts across the 
country and in this district have found Dr. Leo’s expert testimony on false confessions admissible.  
(See Expert Witness Testimony, Ex. B to Leo Report [368-1] at 1–5.)  Defendants do not challenge 
Dr. Leo’s qualifications to testify as a false-confession expert in general. 
B.   Dr. Leo’s Expert Opinion                                        
Dr. Leo enumerates eight opinions in his expert report.  First, he opines that Mr. Brown’s 
description of what occurred during his interrogation is “consistent with empirical social science 
research” on practices “associated with, [that] increase the risk of, and are known to cause” false 
confessions.  (Leo Report at 38 (Opinion 1).)  Second, he states that the Detective Defendants’ 
disputed factual account of their investigation and interrogation of Mr. Brown lack “face validity” 
and “fail to provide a reasonable or coherent explanation of how and why Mr. Brown would have 
falsely confessed to participating in a murder he did not commit.”  (Id. at 38 (Opinion 2).)  Third, 
he opines that Mr. Brown’s description of what occurred during his interrogation “indicates the use 
of  interrogation  techniques  and  practices  that  were  guilt-presumptive,  truth-presumptive, 
confirmatory and theory-driven.”  (Id. (Opinion 3).)  Fourth, he states that Mr. Brown’s account 
includes descriptions of “physically and psychologically coercive interrogation techniques” that 
“cause suspects to perceive that they have no meaningful choice but to comply with the demands 
and requests of their interrogators.”  (Id. at 39 (Opinion 4).)  Fifth, he opines that Mr. Brown’s 
account includes descriptions of risk factors that are associated with false confessions, such as 
“lengthy interrogation, premature rush to judgment and guilt-presumptive interrogation, false 
evidence ploys, threats and promises, and physical and psychological coercion.”  (Id. (Opinion 
5).)  Sixth, he notes that Mr. Brown’s account includes descriptions of “risk factors” that can result 
in self-corroborating false statements.  (Id. (Opinion 6).)  Seventh, he finds that Mr. Brown’s 
statement “bears the hallmarks, characteristics, and indicia of a false and unreliable confession” 
that can be classified as “coerced-compliant.”  (Id. (Opinion 7).)  Finally, he opines that the 
techniques employed by the Detective Defendants during Mr. Brown’s interrogation “violated 
universally accepted police investigation and interrogation national training standards, police 
protocols and best practices that existed in 1988.”  (Id. (Opinion 8).)   
C.   Admissibility                                                   
Defendants do not contest that Dr. Leo is qualified to testify generally concerning false 
confessions and the circumstances or situations that are more or less likely to result in a false 
confession [368].  (Leo Report at 4–17; Defs.’ Leo Br. at 1–2.)  Defendants argue Dr. Leo should 
be barred, however, from offering the following opinions:                 
•  Any opinions that the detectives in this case did not follow police investigation 
  practices or nationally recognized police standards.               
•  Any credibility determinations of Brown, any witness, criminal co-defendants 
  or Brown’s confession.                                             
•  Any  comment  on  the  credibility  or  “reliability”  of  Brown’s  criminal  co-
  defendants’ confessions or certain pieces of evidence.             
•  Opining on the ultimate issues for the jury in this case—that Brown was 
  physically  or  psychologically  coerced  and  that  his  confession  is  false  or 
  fabricated.                                                        
•  Opinions related to the “Error Insertion Trick.”                  
(Defs.’ Leo Br. at 2.)                                                    
     1.   Nationally Recognized Policing Standards                   
Defendants first argue that the court should bar Dr. Leo from providing opinions related to 
police practices because the topic goes beyond his expertise and would be duplicative of 
Mr. Waller’s testimony.  Plaintiff responds that Dr. Leo is “amply qualified by his education, 
research, and experience to opine regarding police interrogation practices, including national 
standards, training, and best practices, as they relate to the social science research on false 
confessions.”  (Pl.’s Leo Resp. [382] at 3.) 5                            

5    Plaintiff states in his response brief that Dr. Leo’s testimony will not be duplicative 
of Mr. Waller’s.  Dr. Leo, he says, will offer opinions regarding “the empirical social science 
research on the types of interrogation techniques, methods, practices, and effects that are 
associated with, increase the risk of, and are known to cause false confessions, and that explain 
how and why innocent individuals are often moved to make and/or agree to false and unreliable 
confessions.”  (Pl.’s Leo Resp. at 4–5 (quoting Leo Report at 2).)  Mr. Waller, on the other hand, 
“will offer opinions on nationally recognized police practices (not on the social science surrounding 
interrogation techniques).”  (Pl.’s Leo Resp. at 5.)  The court agrees that, so long as these experts 
speak only to their areas of expertise, their testimony will not be duplicative, but, as discussed 
The court agrees with Defendants on this point.  Dr. Leo is not an expert on national 
policing  practices,  yet  Opinion  8  of  Dr.  Leo’s  report  is  titled  “Violation  of  National  Police 
Interrogation Training Standards, Protocols and Best Practices.”  (Leo Report at 34.)  In that 
section, Dr. Leo makes several assertions about police officer training, such as “American police 
investigators are universally trained to absolutely avoid use of physical force and coercion in the 
interrogation room” (id.), “American police investigators are trained generally to avoid use of 
threats of harm . . . and promises of leniency . . .” (id. at 35), “American police are trained never 
to deprive a suspect of essential necessities . . .” (id.), “the detectives violated best practice 
standards with respect to police interrogation” (id.), and “American police interrogators are trained 
to avoid . . . disclosing non-public case facts to [a suspect] . . .” (id.).   
These sorts of statements exceed Dr. Leo’s expertise.  See Hall v. Flannery, 

 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that the court “must look at each of the conclusions [an expert] 
draws to see if has the adequate education, skill, and training to reach them”).  The court 
understands that Dr. Leo is well versed in a seminal text in criminal interrogations called the “Reid 
Manual,” which recommends police should not interrogate suspects for longer than four hours 
absent “exceptional circumstances.”  (Pl.’s Leo Resp. at 3; Leo Report at 12, 35 (citing FRED 
INBAU AND JOHN REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (3rd ed. 1986)).)  Dr. Leo’s 
curriculum vitae shows he taught four training sessions on interrogations from 2000 to 2003: two 
in Florida, one in Texas, and one in the Republic of Cyprus.  (Leo CV at 58.)  Dr. Leo also attended 
police interrogation training five times from 1990 to 1993, including four sessions in California and 
one in Georgia.  (Id.)  Those experiences could support a finding that Dr. Leo has knowledge and 
expertise concerning best practices for interrogation, but would not necessarily establish that he 
is an expert concerning actual national police practices in 1988.  Dr. Leo is free to opine that 
lengthy interrogations pose a false-confession risk factor, but—because he does not qualify as 

above, Dr. Leo’s report is not, in fact, as limited in scope as Mr. Brown’s description purports it to 
be.                                                                       
an expert on policing practices more generally—he may not testify that national police practices 
support that opinion.                                                     
Defendants next take issue with Dr. Leo’s opinion that the Detective Defendants made a 
“rush to judgment” in this case.  Defendants argue that this testimony should be barred because 
Dr. Leo fails to cite any national police practices that would require the detectives “to conduct any 
follow-up investigation to test or attempt to corroborate the accuracy of their theory about 
Mr. Brown’s involvement.”  (Defs.’ Leo Br. at 4 (citing Leo Report at 24).)  Defendants are correct 
that Dr. Leo may not testify to legal standards; that is, he may not assert that police had a legal 
obligation,  constitutional  or  otherwise,  to  seek  additional  evidence  that  would  corroborate 
Mr. Brown’s involvement in the arson.  The court also agrees with Defendants that Dr. Leo may 
not testify regarding the Detective Defendants’ states of mind, and thus may not opine, for 
example, that the detectives conducted Brown’s interrogation based on “their gut hunches and 
speculations.”  (Defs.’ Leo Reply [392] at 4 (citing Leo Report at 25).)  At most, the court will allow 
Dr. Leo to explain that the haste of the investigation (clearing a double homicide arson in one day) 
is consistent with a “rush to judgment,” which he identifies as a factor that increases the risk of 
eliciting false compliance and a false confession.  (See Leo Report at 24.)   
Though he may not testify about national police practices, Dr. Leo’s testimony about how 
certain practices are likely to produce false confessions may be helpful to jurors, many of whom 
may find the notion of a false confession counterintuitive.  The Seventh Circuit has recognized 
that false confession expert testimony can be helpful to “let the jury know that a phenomenon 
known as false confessions exists, how to recognize it, and how to decide whether it fits the facts 
of the case being tried.”  See United States v. Hall, 

 (7th Cir. 1996).  And 
several district courts have admitted false-confession expert testimony.  See, e.g., Andersen 
v. City of Chicago, No. 16 C 1963, 

, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2020) (finding false-
confession expert Dr. Saul M. Kassin qualified to speak on false confession risk factors, but not 
matters beyond that expertise, such as DNA results); Harris, 

, at *16 (“Dr. Leo’s 
expert testimony regarding false confessions will be helpful to explain why false confessions 
happen and how to recognize false confessions, thus allowing the jury to use this framework to 
apply to the facts of this case.”); Caine, 

, at *3 (“Dr. Leo will be permitted to 
testify to various factors that can cause false confessions, and to their presence in this case.”); 
see also Hurt v. Vantlin, No. 3:14-cv-00092-JMS-MPB, 

, at *4–5 (S.D. Ind. 
Sept. 26, 2019) (finding that a false-confessions expert may opine on “the circumstances under 
which police interrogation tactics are likely to produce false confessions”). 
     2.   Credibility Assessments and Reliability of Witness’s Confessions 
Defendants argue that Dr. Leo’s report goes beyond assuming the veracity of disputed 
facts and instead seeks to persuade the jury that Mr. Brown’s version of the facts is more credible.  
(Defs.’ Leo Reply at 5.)  In support, Defendants note remarks throughout Dr. Leo’s report 
observing that Mr. Brown’s evidence is “reliable” while Defendants’ bear “indicia of unreliability.”  
(See Leo Report at 2–3, 23–40, 33–36, 38–39.)  Plaintiff insists, in response, that Dr. Leo’s 
testimony is not so much an effort to discredit Defendants directly as an effort to use social science 
research  literature  to  demonstrate  that  Defendants’  factual  account  lacks  “face  validity.”  
Specifically,  he  contends  that  their  account  does  not  “provide  a  reasonable  or  coherent 
explanation of how and why Mr. Brown would have falsely confessed to participating in a murder 
he did not commit.”  (Pl.’s Leo Resp. at 6 (citing Leo Report at 38 ¶ 2).)  
The court agrees with Defendants: As explained above, Dr. Leo may testify regarding the 
hallmark features of false confessions and how to identify them, but he may not opine on the 
reliability of other witnesses (including Mr. Brown) or the deceased investigators’ state of mind.  
This means Dr. Leo will not be permitted to testify to many of the statements he made in his report.  
For example, Dr. Leo may not offer testimony like this to the jury:       
The detectives’ unwavering presumption of Mr. Brown’s guilt and confession-
driven interrogation led to investigative bias, behavioral confirmation bias and 
tunnel  vision:  They  not  only  refused  to  accept  Mr.  Brown’s  protestations  of 
innocence,  but  also  saw  his  later  interrogation-induced  compliance  and 
incriminating statements as corroboration of their belief in his guilt, as opposed to 
the product of their own guilt-presumptive and physically and psychologically 
coercive interrogation techniques.                                   
(Leo Report at 25.)                                                       
Plaintiff urges that Dr. Leo’s use of the words “reliability” and “face validity” instead of 
“credibility” somehow immunizes his testimony from the charge that it improperly usurps the role 
of the jury.  Not so.  See Davis v. Duran, 

 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“It is a fundamental 
premise  of  our  trial  system  that  ‘determining  the  weight  and  credibility  of  witness 
testimony . . . belongs to the jury who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural intelligence 
and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men.’”) (quoting United States v. Scheffer, 

 (1998)).  Dr. Leo may not testify or opine about the reliability or unreliability of 
any of the confessions or other evidence, or about whether the parties’ various versions of the 
events in this case are credible.  This additionally means he may not testify as to how the 
confessions of Mr. Brown, or two persons also convicted of the arson (Michael Harper and 
Geronia Ford) compare with the other evidence of the crime.  See Caine, 

, at 
*3.                                                                       
     3.   Ultimate-Issue Determinations                              
Defendants next argue that Dr. Leo’s report impermissibly tells the jury what conclusion it 
should reach on ultimate issues in this case: whether the Defendants coerced Mr. Brown and 
fabricated his inculpatory statement.  Plaintiff again pushes back on this characterization, and 
contends that Dr. Leo’s testimony is not an opinion that Mr. Brown is innocent, but rather an 
explanation that Mr. Brown’s version of events has features that social science researchers have 
found to be associated with false confessions.  This summary is not entirely accurate.  The court 
concludes that several statements in Dr. Leo’s report do appear to be statements about legal 
standards—matters on which the court will instruct the jury.  Other statements are conclusions 
about the Defendants’ mental states.  Such opinions are inadmissible, including, for example, the 
following:                                                                
•  “Because they presumed Arthur Brown’s guilt from the start, the detectives 
  developed a theory to fit Arthur Brown’s involvement, [and] coerced him into 
  signing a statement to fit their theory.”  (Leo Report at 24.)     
•  “In coercively pressuring and persuading Mr. Brown to sign the prosecutor-
  written and police-edited statement, the detectives sought not to objectively or 
  independently investigate or test the truth, but rather to have Mr. Brown repeat 
  back their preconceived belief about what they assumed and speculated must 
  have led to the Magic Video store fire. The detectives were creating, not 
  gathering, evidence against Mr. Brown.”  (Id. at 25.)              
•  “In my professional opinion, the lengthy interrogation described by Arthur 
  Brown was psychologically coercive . . .” (Id. at 28.)             
•  “There is no reliable evidence linking Mr. Brown to the Magic Video Store fire 
  other than the entirely prosecutor-written and police-edited statement that he 
  signed after a lengthy interrogation that he describes as extremely physically 
  and psychologically coercive.” (Id. at 30.)                        
•  “These features indicate that Mr. Brown’s statement was more likely, if not 
  certainly, the involuntary product of coercive and improper police interrogation 
  methods and pressures than a reliable or trustworthy piece of evidence of 
  criminal guilt.”  (Id.)                                            
Dr. Leo’s opinion about whether Mr. Brown’s confession was, in fact, false and fabricated 
invades the province of the jury.  Here, as was the case in Andersen, 

, at *3, 
“whether [Mr. Brown] is innocent is a dispute at the heart of this case and is one that must be left 
to the jury.”  Opinions like those listed above, which effectively usurp the jury’s function, will not 
be admitted.  Good Shepherd Manor Found., Inc., 323 F.3d at 564 (citing United States v. Sinclair, 

, 757 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Neushwander, No. 15 CR 542-1, 

, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 14, 2017) (“When an expert attempts to impinge on the role 
of the jury, the testimony should be barred.”)                            
     4.   “Error Insertion Trick”                                    
Defendants argue that Dr. Leo should be barred from presenting any opinions regarding 
the “Error Insertion Trick,” which he describes as an “interrogation scripting technique . . . in which 
the interrogator writes out the suspect’s confession statement, intentionally inserts minor factual 
or grammatical errors, and then has the suspect correct and initial these errors.”  (Leo Report at 
16.)  According to Dr. Leo, the purpose of the error insertion trick is two-fold.  First, it “create[s] 
the impression of validating a confession’s voluntariness and accuracy,” and, second, it appears 
to confirm the confessor’s guilt by making the document look as though it demonstrates his 
personal knowledge of the facts of the crime.  (Id. at 34.)  Mr. Brown responds that Dr. Leo may 
opine on this technique because it is one example of the dangers inherent in police interrogation 
scripting.                                                                
The court disagrees.  True, this testimony would satisfy the first Rule 702 factor: Dr. Leo 
has specialized knowledge that would help the jury understand that, if Detective Campbell 
deliberately introduced errors into a fabricated statement, Mr. Brown’s edits would create the 
impression of validating the statement’s voluntariness and accuracy.  (Pl.’s Leo Resp. at 10.)  The 
three remaining factors of Rule 702—that the testimony is based on sufficient acts or data, that it 
is the product of reliable principles and methods, and that the expert has reliably applied the 
principles and methods to the facts—are more problematic.  To support his testimony that the 
error-insertion trick is an interrogation scripting technique, Dr. Leo cites to two pages of a book 
he has written.  (Leo Report at 16 n. 26.)  Dr. Leo does not say how prevalent use of this trick is 
on those pages, which discuss two anecdotal accounts of its use.  RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE 
INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008) at 175–76.  He otherwise cites one page of another 
scholar’s work, which includes a single anecdote in which a prosecutor explained how he learned 
of the strategic value of inserting incorrect information on minor points in statements.  (Leo Report 
at  16  n.  26  (citing  MARK  GODSEY,  BLIND  JUSTICE:  A  FORMER  PROSECUTOR  EXPOSES  THE 
PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS OF WRONGFUL CONVICTION (2017) at 144).)  Dr. Leo provides no data 
in his report or deposition on how widespread or well known a practice the error-insertion trick 
was or is among police officers.  He testified that he is unaware whether Campbell or Whitehouse 
ever received any training on the error-insertion trick.  And he acknowledged that there is no 
factual basis to suggest that the technique was taught to any police officers in Chicago in 1988 or 
before.  (Dep. of Richard Leo (“Leo Dep.”), Ex. 2 to Defs.’ Leo Br. [368-2] at 308:24–310:24.)  
There are no facts or data supporting an inference that the detectives in this case were aware of 
the error-insertion trick; alone, the existence of corrected errors on the statement is not enough 
(errors could, after all, have been accidental rather than intentional).  Consequently, assuming 
that Dr. Leo (or Dr. Kassin, whose scholarship Dr. Leo cites for support) has used reliable 
methodologies to assert the existence of the error-insertion trick, the court does not find that Dr. 
Leo has reliably applied those methodologies to the facts of this case, as required by Rule 702.  
The court notes, further, that Rule 403 militates in favor of exclusion of this evidence: any 
probative value of Dr. Leo’s testimony on the error-insertion trick is substantially outweighed by 
the risk that such testimony would confuse and mislead the jury into believing that, because there 
are corrected errors in the statement, those errors and corrections are more likely the result of 
deliberate insertion than earnest efforts to achieve accuracy.  The fact that Detective Campbell is 
deceased and therefore unable to speak for himself in this proceeding renders this testimony all 
the more prejudicial.  Dr. Leo’s “error insertion” testimony will be barred.   
D.   Summary                                                         
Dr. Leo is barred from testifying to Opinions 2, 3, 4 and 8.  He may testify to his remaining 
opinions in accordance with the limitations set forth above.              
IV.  Defense Expert Dr. Michael Welner                                    
A.   Dr. Welner’s Qualifications                                     
Defendants have retained as an expert Dr. Michael Welner, a board-certified forensic 
psychiatrist with expertise in the study of disputed confessions.  (Curriculum Vitae (“Welner CV”), 
Expert Report of Michael Welner (“Welner Report”), Ex. B to Pl.’s Mot. to Bar Defs.’ Expert (“Pl.’s 
Welner Br.”) [366-2] at 1.)  Dr. Welner holds an undergraduate degree in biology and a medical 
degree from the University of Miami, and he completed postdoctoral training at the Beth Israel 
Medical Center in New York City and at the University of Pennsylvania.  (Welner CV at 27; Dep. 
of Michael Welner (“Welner Dep.”), Ex. C to Pl.’s Welner Br. [366-3] at 59:12–17.)  He has 
interviewed and assessed hundreds of criminal defendants about their choice to confess, has 
taught and lectured on the assessment of disputed confessions, and has qualified as an expert 
in courts across the country in cases relating to disputed confessions.  (See generally Welner 
CV.)  Welner estimated at his deposition that he had reviewed around 70 disputed-confession 
cases in the past 20 years.  (Welner Dep. at 72:16–74:12.)  Mr. Brown does not contend that 
Dr. Welner is not qualified to testify at all but argues that Dr. Welner’s “core opinion demonstrates 
that his testimony falls outside of the bounds of Rule 702.”  (Pl.’s Welner Br. at 4.) 
B.   Dr. Welner’s Expert Opinions                                    
Dr. Welner’s report offers opinions on five broad issues: (1) how competing accounts of 
the circumstances surrounding Mr. Brown’s self-incriminating statements relate to “what has been 
demonstrated and is known about false confessions”; (2) what empirical research “informs the 
understanding of false confessions”; (3) how Mr. Brown’s account of the conduct of Detective Fine 
“speak[s] to interrogation techniques implicated in false confessions”; (4) what opinions of Dr. Leo 
have not been demonstrated with a valid methodology; and (5) what assertions made by Dr. Leo 
are factually incorrect or inconsistent with published research on false confessions.  (Welner 
Report at 2–3.)                                                           
With respect to the first topic, Dr. Welner opines that, because there is a dispute over 
whether Mr. Brown is actually innocent, false-confession research “may be entirely irrelevant to 
this case.”  (Id. at 13.)  If one accepts Mr. Brown’s version of events, he observes, then Mr. Brown 
did not confess at all, so research regarding statements by an actually innocent person who says 
he is guilty is not relevant.  Alternatively, if Defendants’ account is correct, then Mr. Brown gave 
a truthful confession after being presented with evidence of his guilt.  And Dr. Welner asserts that 
there is research showing that inmates cite perception of evidence against them as a common 
prompt for their confessions.  (Id.)                                      
On the issue of empirical research involving confessions, Dr. Welner discusses the work 
of Dr. Gisli H. Gudjonsson, a forensic psychologist and ex-police officer whose research includes 
inquiries into whether certain personal qualities (such as “suggestibility”) may make a person 
more likely to falsely confess during an interrogation.  (Id. at 16.)  “Apart from what Dr. Gudjonsson 
has studied,” Dr. Welner states, “systematic research that informs false confessions with data that 
can validly apply to case assessment such as this is admittedly limited.”  (Id.)  That portion of his 
report also includes the following bolded and underlined statement: “There is no research that 
informs  or  delineates  the  nature  and  impact  of  interrogation  practices  that  lead  to  false 
confessions in major crimes for which suspects would face significant penalties.”  (Id. at 17.)  He 
goes on to critique Dr. Leo’s opinion as unsupported by any such research.     
Dr. Welner’s third opinion relates to interrogation techniques.  Mr. Brown has testified that 
Detective Fine choked him to the point of unconsciousness and repeatedly slammed him into a 
wall.  Dr. Welner appears to understand Plaintiff’s position to be that such a physical assault is a 
“technique” designed to induce a confession; not surprisingly, Dr. Welner contends that physically 
abusive conduct would not constitute a “technique” and is in fact “the absence of technique.”  (Id. 
at 25.)  Apart from his insistence that physical abuse is not an authorized practice, Dr. Weiner has 
not addressed the question whether unauthorized behavior of an officer who engages in such 
abuse or chokes a suspect might be likely to generate a false confession.      
Dr. Welner’s fourth and fifth opinions take aim at Dr. Leo’s testimony:  Dr. Welner asserts 
that the value of Dr. Leo’s testimony is limited because no empirical research exists on what kinds 
of interrogation techniques, methods, practices, or effects are associated with, increase the risk 
of, and are known to cause false confessions.  (Id. at 25–26.)  He contends, further, that Dr. Leo’s 
report includes statements that are “false, highly misleading, irrelevant to the case at hand, or 
otherwise beyond standards of practices in this area” (id. at 35) and goes on to list what he 
believes are several examples of methodological shortcomings in Dr. Leo’s report. 
C.   Admissibility                                                   
Plaintiff argues that all of Dr. Welner’s opinions should be excluded because he has 
opined that there is no relevant specialized knowledge that could apply to Mr. Brown’s case [366].  
In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Welner should be barred from testifying beyond the 
scope of his expertise, and so should not be allowed to testify regarding police practices, legal 
proceedings, witness credibility, or any party’s intent.                  
     1.   Sufficient Facts or Data                                   
Plaintiff argues that the first three of Dr. Welner’s opinions reject the application of false 
confession science or research to Mr. Brown’s case and thus, by Dr. Welner’s own admission, his 
opinions are not informed by sufficient facts or data.  Defendants respond that Plaintiff distorts Dr. 
Welner’s report: as they understand Dr. Welner, he has not said that false confession research 
does not exist, but instead that empirical research on the subject is limited.  This limitation, Dr. 
Welner opines, is significant because research showing associations between risk factors and 
false confessions do not support the firm conclusions that one could draw from the results of 
robust empirical research.  (Defs.’ Welner Resp. [386] at 2–3; Welner Report at 15–20.)   
That Dr. Welner is critical of Dr. Leo’s methodology does not require the conclusion that 
his own opinion is inadmissible.  Like Dr. Leo’s opinions, many of Dr. Welner’s opinions are 
informed by his professional experiences.  Dr. Welner opines that, if the fact finder credits 
Mr. Brown’s version of events, this case does not include a false confession (because Mr. Brown 
insists he never made a statement at all), so false confession research is of limited value.  
Dr. Welner’s own experience and research could assist the jury in understanding the Defendants’ 
version of disputed facts.  Experts often disagree.  The difference in the approaches adopted by 
Dr. Leo and Dr. Welner does not render either expert’s testimony inadmissible; both sides are 
entitled to present their expert’s perspective to the jury.               
     2.   Reliability of Principles and Methods                      
Plaintiff next argues that Dr. Welner’s opinions are not the product of reliable principles 
and methods, but rather amount to “speculative, abstract statements that are nothing more than 
bottom-line conclusions.”  (Pl.’s Welner Br. at 6–7.)  Mr. Brown takes particular issue with two 
aspects of Dr. Welner’s opinion: his statement that false confessions to murder in the context of 
police interrogations are rare, and his discussion of various pressures and incentives that motivate 
a suspect to confess or to refuse to do so.  (Id. at 7.)  Because the court “must look at each of the 
conclusions [an expert] draws individually to see if he has the adequate education, skill, and 
training to reach them,” the court addresses these points in turn.  Rivera v. Guevara, No. 12 C 
04428, 

, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2018) (quoting Hall, 

). 
Regarding the first matter, Mr. Brown argues that Dr. Welner is not qualified to offer his 
opinion that false confessions in murder and serious crimes are rare.  Dr. Welner has not 
explained his methodology for reaching this conclusion, and he has not performed research on 
the prevalence of disputed confessions for serious crimes.  Lack of research alone may not doom 
Dr. Welner’s testimony; an expert may be qualified to testify based on experience—but only if the 
expert “explains how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a 
sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.”  Burgs v. 
Pearson, No. 13 C 1988, 

, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2014); Metavante Corp. v. 
Emigrant Sav. Bank, 

 (7th Cir. 2010) (“An expert’s testimony is not unreliable 
simply because it is founded on his experience rather than on data; indeed, Rule 702 allows a 
witness to be ‘qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.’”); 
Walker  v.  Soo  Line  R.R.  Co.,  

  (7th  Cir.  2000)  (“Rule  702  specifically 
contemplates the admission of testimony by experts whose knowledge is based on experience.”).  
In this case, the court will sustain an objection to Dr. Welner’s testimony about the rarity of false 
confessions unless Defendants are able to lay the foundation for a conclusion that Dr. Welner’s 
experience sufficiently qualifies him to hold such a view.6               
As to the second matter, Mr. Brown contends that Dr. Welner is not qualified to opine on 
why guilty people are incentivized to confess, while innocent people are not.  Dr. Welner opines 


6    Just as Dr. Welner may not make naked assertions about the rarity of false 
confessions for serious crimes, Dr. Leo is not permitted to testify that the established number of 
false confessions to murder are the “tip of a much larger iceberg” of incidents and have been 
subject to a “dramatic undercount,” unless he is able to identify the methodological basis for that 
claim.  (Leo Report at 5.)                                                
that, if one accepts Defendants’ version of the facts, Mr. Brown’s voluntary confession aligns with 
forensic  psychology  research  because  “[c]onfessions  routinely  follow  when  suspects  are 
confronted with what they believe to be powerful evidence of their guilt.”  (Welner Report at 13.)  
He goes on to remark that in the research of truthful confessions—applicable here, in Defendants’ 
view, because Mr. Brown was in fact guilty—inmates most often cite “perception of proof” as a 
prompt for admitting their guilt.  (Id. (citing Gisli H. Gudjonsson & Jon F. Sigurdsson, The 
Gudjonsson Confession Questionnaire-Revised (GCQ-R) factor structure and its relationship with 
personality,  27  PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 5  (1999)  at  953–68).)    Because 
Dr. Welner has explained the principle underlying his opinion and applied it to the facts of this 
case, he may offer this testimony at trial.                               
Later in his report, however, Dr. Welner does not draw a clear line from his experience to 
the conclusions he draws.  Take, for example, the following paragraph:    
There are numerous reasons why someone may conceal or even distort facts 
known only to those with guilty knowledge.  In a crime for which there is already 
an arrested perpetrator (in this case there were Mr. Harper and Mr. Ford), less 
detail makes it easier to blame someone else as a prime mover in the crime.  Under 
such circumstances, the confessing suspect is invested in revealing as little as 
possible,  minimizing  detail  and  convincing  an  interviewer  that  the  debrief  is 
complete.  However, discrepancies with facts do not render that person innocent. 
(Id. at 33.)  Dr. Welner offers a theory for a person’s decision to conceal or distort details of a 
confession, but he does not explain the methodology or principle that supports such a theory.  
Defendants argue that Dr. Welner’s training and experience in interviewing inmates who have 
confessed qualifies him to offer such an opinion.  While Defendants are correct that such 
experience may support the conclusion that Dr. Welner qualifies as an expert, that experience 
alone is insufficient to render his testimony admissible: he must also explain the methodologies 
that support the specific opinions he proffers.  If there is a methodology behind Dr. Welner’s 
conclusions, he has not clearly articulated it.  It is unclear, for example, if Dr. Welner bases his 
opinion on interviews he conducted with inmates and, if so, whether those inmates told him that 
they had concealed or distorted details in the confessions to mitigate their culpability.  He does 
not say whether he compared statements given by arrestees with the evidence later introduced 
at trial; nor does he explain whether he looked in particular at statements given by persons who 
knew there were other suspects in custody.  Without a more adequate foundation, Dr Welner he 
will not be permitted to offer an opinion like this at trial.             
     3.   Rebuttal Testimony                                         
Mr. Brown argues that the sole purpose of Dr. Welner’s testimony is to dispute the 
admissibility of Dr. Leo’s opinions.  Such a purpose is improper, as the admissibility of Dr. Leo’s 
opinions is for this court, not the jury, to decide.  See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595; Kumho, 

; Masters v. Hesston Corp., 

 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[D]istrict judges play a 
‘gatekeeping’  role  in  maintaining  scientific  expert  testimony  within  proper  bounds.  Daubert 
requires judges to determine that scientific testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is both 
relevant and reliable.”).  In response to Questions 2, 4, and 5, Dr. Welner critiques the “empirical 
research foundation that informs the understanding of false confessions,” specifically challenging 
the quality, sufficiency, and reliability of the data Dr. Leo relies on in this field.  (Welner Report at 
15–20 (Opinion 2), 25–35 (Opinion 4), 35–42 (Opinion 5).)  For a few examples: Dr. Welner 
criticizes Dr. Leo for inflating the extent that experts have corroborated his research by using the 
word “researchers” instead of “I” when citing to his own work.  (Id. at 29, 37.)  Dr. Welner dismisses 
a citation in Dr. Leo’s discussion of false evidence ploys as “a review article co-authored by 
Dr. Leo that cites further to polemics he has published advocating against what he terms false 
evidence ploys.”  (Id. at 26–27.)  Dr. Welner contends that Dr. Leo has “comingle[d] aspirations 
he has about justice policy with what he asserts are ‘scientific’ understandings of what causes 
false confessions.”  (Id. at 27.)  He criticizes Dr. Leo for “touting empirical research that does not 
exist and never happened.”  (Id. at 30.)  And Dr. Welner ends his expert report with the following 
remark: “Dr. Leo uses the platform of his advocacy writing in psychological literature as a 
substitute for the scientific study of a boutique area that he long ago acknowledged was sorely in 
need of proper methodological rigor in order to inform courts about the points he raises in the 
Brown case.”  (Id. at 42.)                                                
Dr.  Welner’s  rebuttal  opinions  in  this  case  are  similar  to  those  he  offered  in 
Chatman v. City of Chicago, No. 14 C 2945, 

, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2018), 
and this court is inclined to adopt an approach similar to the one Judge Lee took there:  Dr. Welner 
may offer his critiques of Dr. Leo’s methodology at trial based on his own professional experience 
as a forensic psychiatrist.  That means Dr. Welner may opine that Dr. Leo’s research does not 
accord with what he has experienced in his own line of work—that is, that Dr. Leo’s theory does 
not align with practice.  See Angelopoulos v. Keystone Orthopedic Specialists, S.C., No. 12 CV 
5836, 

, at *10 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2017) (while an expert may not opine that an 
opposing expert’s testimony “will not help the trier of fact to determine the facts at issue” under 
Daubert, an opposing expert “remains free to criticize [an opposing expert’s] methodology, factual 
assumptions, and conclusions”).  He may not, however, opine that Dr. Leo is a charlatan and his 
scholarship “hogwash.”  Chatman, 

, at *4.  Dr. Welner’s critiques must be 
informed by his experience as a forensic psychiatrist; to the extent his opinions of Dr. Leo are not 
supported  by  that  experience,  his  critiques  may  be  explored  in  defense  counsel’s  cross-
examination of Dr. Leo rather than in Dr. Welner’s expert testimony.      
D.   Scope of Testimony                                              
As discussed above, Dr. Welner’s testimony is only admissible to the extent that it falls 
within the scope of his expertise.  On this point, further remarks are necessary. 
     1.   Police Practices                                           
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Welner is not qualified to opine on police practices and that his 
opinions related to police practices are “thinly veiled credibility assessments.”  (Pl.’s Welner Br. 
at 10.)  Defendants respond that Dr. Welner does not opine on police practices generally, but 
rather points to facts (some of which are disputed) that he says Dr. Leo dismissed.  The court 
agrees with Plaintiff that discussing the motivations of law enforcement officials is beyond 
Dr. Welner’s expertise.  Dr. Welner lacks training in law enforcement interrogation techniques and 
does not otherwise purport to have expertise on that subject.  Accordingly, Dr. Welner is barred 
from testifying to the Detective Defendant’ motivations for interrogating Mr. Brown.  He may not, 
for example, offer the following testimony:                               
There is, moreover, no history of animosity or conflict between Arthur Brown and 
any member of the Chicago Police Department to explain why any of the civil 
defendants, or anyone they answer to, would shoehorn Arthur Brown into their self-
incriminating statements as an innocent man. The only reason police had interest 
in Arthur Brown was because of available evidence—his having been specifically 
identified as an accomplice by Michael Harper and Geronia Ford.      
(Welner Report at 15.)  Dr. Welner’s qualifications do not provide him a foundation to opine on 
the motivations of the investigators in this case.                        
Other aspects of Dr. Welner’s testimony concerning police interrogations is, however, 
admissible.  To rebut Dr. Leo’s opinion, Dr. Welner may testify as to his experience in interviewing 
individuals who have confessed to crimes and examining and studying the nature and content of 
their confessions, the manner in which those inmates inculpated themselves, and the motivations 
and pressures that led them to decide to confess.  He may observe that the content of Mr. Brown’s 
statement shifts primary responsibility to other actors and minimizes Mr. Brown’s role in the crime.  
(Welner Report at 22.)                                                    
     2.   Legal Proceedings                                          
Like  the  experts  discussed  above,  Dr.  Welner  will  be  barred  from  offering  opinion 
testimony about Mr. Brown’s previous legal proceedings, including opinions about the strategic 
decisions made by prosecutors during Mr. Brown’s trials and the significance of various judicial 
findings.  For the sake of clarity, the court offers the following examples of his opinions  concerning 
the procedural circumstances of Mr. Brown’s conviction and exoneration—opinions that appear 
to exceed the scope of his expertise :                                    
•  In 2017, a judge granted a new trial on the basis of his attorneys’ ineffective 
  assistance and improper prosecutor argument at his 2008 retrial, as opposed 
  to evidence of a coerced or false confession, or of Mr. Brown’s innocence. The 
  state elected not to retry him in 2017, but decision-makers such as ASA Eric 
  Sussman have since testified that decision was based on an unwillingness to 
  allocate the human and financial resources of an overtaxed Chicago State’s 
  Attorney’s Office to a new trial of a defendant who had already served nearly 
  thirty years for murder.  (Welner Report at 11.)                   
•  Prosecutors have no plan to charge Mr. Bell, and to this day believe his claims 
  to be non-credible.  Mr. Brown testified in 2020 that he did not know Mr. Bell, 
  let alone buy any drugs from him or anyone.  And while his attorneys testified 
  that they would never have presented testimony they knew to have been false, 
  Mr. Brown, who knew it [to be] false, expressed indifference to the specter of 
  his using a false claim to attempt to overturn his conviction.  (Id. at 12.) 
•  Notwithstanding that the court’s 2017 decision to vacate the conviction was not 
  about the merits of Mr. Bell’s claim, Mr. Brown’s attorney, Jamal Muhammad, 
  wrote to Mr. Bell, “In large part because of you, Mr. Brown has been freed.”  
  Indeed, the 2008 retrial would not have happened were Bell not to have 
  presented himself as solely responsible for the arson murders. (Id.) 
Such statements fall beyond Dr. Welner’s expertise and are likely to “confuse or distract the jury.” 
See Sinclair, 

.  Accordingly, they are inadmissible at trial.  
     3.   Credibility and Intent                                     
All parties recognize that determining the weight and credibility of witness testimony is the 
exclusive province of the jury.  See Andersen, 454 F. Supp. at 816 (quoting Goodwin v. MTD 
Prod., Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2000)).  Experts are not permitted to offer opinions as to 
the believability or truthfulness of that testimony.  Jordan v. City of Chicago, No. 08 C 6902, 

, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2012) (quoting United States v. Hall, 

 
(7th Cir. 1999); Goodwin, 

 (“credibility questions are within the province of the trier 
of fact”).  Expert testimony regarding a person’s intent or state of mind is similarly off limits: “An 
expert’s  assertions  about  another  person’s  intent  are  neither  helpful  nor  admissible  under 
Rule 702.”  United States v. Schultz, No. 14-CR-467-3, 

, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 
22, 2016) (collecting authority).                                         
On this issue, the following directions are exemplary and not exhaustive.  Dr. Welner may 
testify that “[s]tandard practice in forensic mental health is to assign greater value to accounts 
chronologically closest to the event.”  (Welner Report at 22, 22 n.15.)  He may testify that forensic 
psychiatrists have posited multiple explanations for how an invested litigant’s account evolves 
overtime.  (Id. at 15.)  He may testify that, if one accepts Defendants’ version of the facts, the 
detectives presented Mr. Brown with an opportunity to issue a statement mitigating his culpability 
following Harper and Ford’s statements.  (Id.)  He can remark that, in his opinion, the statement 
Mr. Brown signed minimized his culpability as compared to Harper’s.  (Id.)  He may note that 
nothing in Mr. Brown’s statement speaks to his relationship with the landlord of the strip mall.  (Id. 
at 23.)                                                                   
But, as noted above, in light of Dr. Welner’s lack of expertise in interrogation techniques 
and police training, he may not testify that Mr. Brown’s testimony contradicts any such training.  
(Id. at 22.)  He also may not testify that “Mr. Brown’s criminal history would understandably have 
led him to consider that the criminal justice system would treat him leniently.”  (Id. at 23.)   
Significantly, Dr. Welner also may not testify to the credibility of James Bell.  On page 12 
of his report, Dr. Welner discusses how Mr. Bell played a role in Mr. Brown’s release from prison 
by testifying at Mr. Brown’s 2003 post-conviction hearing and retrial in 2008.  In his report, 
Dr. Welner goes on to recount Mr. Bell’s phone calls from prison.  Yet it is not at all clear how the 
facts surrounding Bell’s conduct support Dr. Welner’s opinion, as a forensic psychiatrist, about 
Mr. Brown’s disputed confession (which long predated Bell’s involvement).  Instead, Dr. Welner’s 
testimony regarding Mr. Bell amounts to little more than inadmissible parroting of Defendants’ 
case.  Brownlee, 

; Goldberg, 

.  Defendants claim that Dr. Welner 
can discuss Bell’s statements as evidence that Dr. Leo should have considered in his analysis 
(Defs.’ Welner Resp. at 12); Defendants’ position in this regard may be explored during Dr. Leo’s 
cross-examination, but it is not an appropriate subject of Dr. Welner’s own expert testimony. 
What the court has discussed here are relevant examples.  The general principle is clear:  
Dr. Welner may only offer his expert opinion when those opinions specifically relate to his 
expertise in forensic psychiatry.  This will require that he refrain from offering opinions on 
credibility of witnesses or their mental state—which may prove difficult for him.  So long as he 
complies with these limitations, his testimony will be admissible at trial, where it can be subject to 
vigorous cross-examination.  See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596; Chatman, 

, at *3. 
 E.     Summary 
 Dr. Welner is  barred from testifying to substantial  portions of each  of his opinions,  as 
detailed above.  He may offer his opinion on the general markers of false or true confessions in 
so far as those opinions are based on his experience and expertise as a forensic psychiatrist. 
While his discussion of how perceptions of proof can incentivize an individual to confess may help 
the jury, his inflammatory remarks about Dr. Leo and his colleagues will not.  Should Dr. Welner 
stray from basing his opinion on his professional expertise—as is often the case in his written 
report—the court will sustain objections to his testimony at trial. 
                           CONCLUSION 
 In accordance with the discussion above, Defendants’ motions to bar or limit the testimony 
of Dr. Kavanaugh, Mr. Waller, and Dr. Leo are granted in part and denied in part.  Plaintiff's motion 
to bar or limit the testimony of Dr. Welner is denied in part and granted in part. 
                                  ENTER: 

Dated:  March 17, 2023                   bree   HE  A     4 
                                  REBECCA R. PALLMEYER 
                                  United States District Judge 

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