United States of America v. Zen Alldredge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                                              
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK                                             
---------------------------------------------------------------------- X   
                                   :                                 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,               :                                 
                                   :                                 
     -v-                           :                                 
                                   :        23 Cr. 537 (JPC)         
ZEN ALLDREDGE,                          :       25 Civ. 1261 (JPC)        
                                   :                                 
               Defendant.          :     OPINION AND ORDER           
                                   :                                 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- X     

JOHN P. CRONAN, United States District Judge:                             
After pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering, Zen Alldredge was 
sentenced to thirty months’ imprisonment and was ordered to pay forfeiture and restitution, each 
in the amount of approximately $2.5 million.  Alldredge now moves under 

 to 
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, arguing that the Government illegally searched his items 
and coerced his statements, engaged in bad-faith and coercive plea discussions, and committed 
prosecutorial misconduct by overcharging him.  Alldredge, however, waived his ability to make 
those arguments in his plea agreement and, in any event, they lack merit.  So the Court denies 
Alldredge’s motion.                                                       
                     I.  Background                                  
In 2020 and 2021, Alldredge laundered about $2.5 million of proceeds that had been stolen 
from victims of a “boiler room,” a fraudulent scheme in which participants posing as investment 
brokers use high-pressure sale techniques to trick victims into buying worthless or non-existent 
securities.  Dkt. 27 (“PSR”) ¶ 8.1  Alldredge laundered that money by moving it through a series 

1 Except where otherwise indicated, all docket citations refer to the docket in the underlying 
criminal matter, United States v. Alldredge, No. 23 Cr. 537 (JPC) (S.D.N.Y.).  
of transactions involving shell companies, cryptocurrency, and property purchases.  

.  The 
$2.5 million was laundered in two parts.  As for the first $2 million, Alldredge received from a co-
conspirator a cashier’s check of fraud proceeds which Alldredge deposited in a Nevada bank 
account that he had opened.  

.  Alldredge then transferred over $1.1 million from that 
account into a New York bank account that he also had opened and made various transactions out 

of both accounts which showed an intent to conceal the money.  

.  The latter, almost 
$500,000 was received directly from victims and then sent to conspirators overseas.  

.   
In October 2023, Alldredge was indicted by a grand jury in this District and charged with 
one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 

(h).  Dkt. 2 
(“Indictment”) ¶¶ 1-3.  That charge carried a maximum sentence of twenty years in prison.  See 

(a).  The Indictment included a forfeiture allegation which identified six specific 
assets alleged to have been involved in the offense or traceable to property involved in the offense.  
Those assets were: (1) $203,000 seized from a Nevada account held in the name of Alldredge’s 
fictitious business; (2) $240,000 in cash seized from Alldredge’s safety-deposit box in Beverly 

Hills, California; (3) miscellaneous precious metals seized from that safety-deposit box; (4) real 
property in Minden, Nevada; (5) real property in Celebration, Florida; and (6) real property in 
Hawthorne, Nevada.  Indictment ¶ 4; see also PSR ¶¶ 13-14.                
On April 11, 2024, Alldredge waived indictment and pleaded guilty to a one-count 
superseding  Information  pursuant  to  a  plea  agreement  with  the  Government.    Dkt.  19 
(“Information”); Dkt. 46, Exh. 1 (“Plea Agreement”).  The Information also alleged a conspiracy 
to commit money laundering, but charged a conspiracy in violation of 

, rather than 
in violation of 

(h) as originally charged in the Indictment.  Information ¶¶ 1-3.  
The superseding charge carried a maximum sentence of five years in prison.  See 

.  
And the Information’s forfeiture allegation excluded the precious metals in Alldredge’s safety-
deposit box.  Compare Information ¶ 4 with Indictment ¶ 4.                
Under the terms of the Plea Agreement, the parties stipulated to a range under the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines of thirty to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment, and Alldredge 
admitted a forfeiture allegation of $2,552,432.13—which “represent[ed] property involved in [the] 

offense,” corresponding to the five categories of assets in the Information.  Plea Agreement at 1-
3.  Alldredge agreed that he would neither “file a direct appeal[] nor bring a collateral challenge . . . 
under Title 

 . . . of any sentence within or below the Stipulated 
Guidelines Range of 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment.”  Plea Agreement at 5.  He further “agree[d] 
not to appeal or bring a collateral challenge of any forfeiture amount or restitution amount that is 
less than or equal to $2,552,432.13.”  

  And he “waive[d] the right” to discovery materials under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, “agree[ing] not to withdraw [his] plea or to attack [his] 
conviction or sentence, either on direct appeal or collaterally, on the ground that the Government 
has failed to produce any such information, apart from any information establishing [his] factual 

innocence.”  

  Ultimately, Alldredge acknowledged that he “accepted th[e] Agreement and 
decided to plead guilty because [he] is in fact guilty.”  

             
This Court allocuted Alldredge as to the superseding Information and the Plea Agreement 
on April 11, 2024.  See April 11, 2024 Minute Entry; Dkt. 46, Exh. 2 (“Plea Tr.”).  After placing 
Alldredge under oath, the Court first confirmed Alldredge’s competence to waive his right to be 
indicted by a grand jury and to enter an informed plea of guilty.  Plea Tr. at 5:7-8:4.  Alldredge 
then waived indictment, with this Court finding that such waiver was “made freely, intelligently, 
knowingly, and voluntarily.”  

.  The Court then walked Alldredge through the trial 
rights he would be relinquishing by pleading guilty.  

.  Among other things, 
Alldredge confirmed that he had the opportunity to “discuss with [his] attorneys whether there is 
a basis to seek suppression of some or all of the evidence that the government has against [him] 
on the grounds that [his] constitutional rights were violated,” and his understanding that if he 
“plead[ed] guilty, [he] would be giving up [his] right to seek suppression of any of the evidence 
against [him].”  

.  He also stated that he understood that by pleading guilty, there 

would “be no appeal with respect to whether the government can use the evidence it has against 
[him]” or “whether [he] did or did not commit the crime alleged in the superseding information.”  

.                                               
As for the Plea Agreement, Alldredge confirmed that he had read it, discussed it with his 
attorneys, and “fully underst[ood]” it before signing it.  

.  Specifically, Alldredge 
confirmed  understanding  that  under  the  Plea  Agreement,  he  was  “admitting  the  forfeiture 
allegation with respect to Count One of the superseding information” and “agree[ing] to forfeit to 
the United States a sum of money equal to $2,552,432.13 in U.S. currency representing property 
involved in the said offense and all right, title, and interest that [he] ha[d] as to specific property,” 

which  were  the  five  categories  of  assets  in  the  Information.    

.    He  also 
acknowledged having read, understood, and signed a consent forfeiture order in which he “would 
be consenting to [the Court] entering a money judgment with respect to the amount that [the Court] 
mentioned . . . and also a judgment with respect to the specific property” the Court listed.  

.  Alldredge understood that he had “agreed not to appeal or [collaterally] challenge any 
forfeiture that is less than or equal to $2,552,432.13.”  

.  He further acknowledged 
having reached a binding agreement with the Government “as to the applicable guideline range of 
30 to 37 months,” 

, and understanding that he had “waive[d] [his] right to appeal 
or otherwise challenge, such as a collateral challenge like a habeas petition, any sentence that 
entails a term of imprisonment that is 37 months or less,” 

.  Alldredge confirmed 
that nothing had been left out of the Plea Agreement, that the Agreement constituted his ”complete 
and  total  understanding”  of  the  bargain  reached  with  the  Government,  that  other  than  the 
Agreement no promises or offers of inducement had been made to get him to plead guilty, and that 
no one threatened him or forced him to plead guilty and sign the Agreement.  

.  

And he further confirmed that he was satisfied with his attorneys’ representation of him in the 
case.  

.                                                   
Alldredge then admitted, in his own words, what he did that made him “believe” he was 
“guilty of Count One of the superseding information”:                     
From May 2020 to April ’21, I agreed with another person to conduct a financial 
transaction involving funds I understood to be proceeds of unlawful activity.  I 
knew the transaction was designed to conceal the sources of those funds.  

On or about November 25, 2020, I wired [$]150,000 representing illegal proceeds 
from an account in Nevada State Bank to an account at J.P. Morgan.  And at the 
time I knew what I was doing was wrong.                              

.  Alldredge affirmed that he “engage[d] in this activity with others who were also 
involved in the same scheme” and reiterated that he “understood the funds to be proceeds of illegal 
activity.”  

.  That illegal activity, the Government proffered, was “wire fraud,” which 
Alldredge and his counsel did not contest.  

.           
Following his admission and the Government’s proffer, Alldredge pleaded guilty to Count 
One of the Information and admitted the forfeiture allegation in the Information.  

.  
Having concluded the allocution, the Court accepted Alldredge’s guilty plea and entered a 
judgment of guilty on the Information’s sole count.  

.  Later that day, the Court 
entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment, which 
was referenced in the Plea Agreement and signed by the parties.  Dkt. 21. 
Alldredge’s sentencing was held on September 10, 2024.  Dkt. 46, Exh. 3 (“Sentencing 
Tr.”).  Aldredge confirmed having reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report and discussed it 
with his attorneys.  

.  His only objection to that Report was being characterized at 
one point as a “money launderer”; because he pleaded “to a conspiracy and not to substantive 
money laundering,” he instead preferred language indicating that he had “participated in a money 

laundering conspiracy.”  

; see PSR ¶ 8.2  Alldredge had no other objections to the 
factual recitations in the Report, Sentencing Tr. at 7:1-3, which laid out the circumstances under 
which he committed the conspiracy to launder money, PSR ¶¶ 8-15.  After calculating the 
Guidelines range in the same way as the parties did in the Plea Agreement, Sentencing Tr. at 7:18-
9:19,  the  Court  sentenced  Alldredge  to  a  bottom-of-the-Guidelines  term  of  thirty  months’ 
imprisonment, to be followed by two years’ supervised release, and ordered restitution to the 
victims whose money he laundered3 and the agreed-upon forfeiture.  

. 
On February 10, 2025, Alldredge filed a pro se motion under Section 2255 to vacate, set 
aside, or correct his sentence.  Dkt. 36 (“Motion”).  His motion sets forth three grounds for relief.  

First, Alldredge claims that his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights were violated through 
unlawful searches and seizures of his cell phones and lock box, along with coerced statements; 
these violations, he argues, “contributed to sentencing errors, resulting in an inflated sentencing 
guideline range and an unjust sentence.”  

.  Second, he claims that the Government 
engaged  in  bad-faith  plea  negotiations  “by  intentionally  conditioning  the  continuation  of 

2 In response to that objection, the Court revised the first part of the relevant sentence of 
the Presentence Investigation Report to read: “Zen Alldredge participated in a money laundering 
conspiracy while based in California and Nevada, and in 2020 and 2021 laundered approximately 
$2.5 million of proceeds . . . .”  Sentencing Tr. at 6:18-23; see PSR ¶ 8.  Neither party objected to 
that modification.  Sentencing Tr. at 6:24-25.                            
3 On May 7, 2025, the Court entered an Order of Restitution, requiring Alldredge to pay 
restitution in the amount of $2,497,992.40.  Dkt. 42.                     
negotiations on not having to turn over critical discovery documents,” which he says—combined 
with “threats of escalating charges and severe penalties”—forced him to make “an uninformed 
decision to accept the plea deal.”  

.  And third, he claims that the Government 
overcharged him with conspiracy to commit money laundering because there was no “factual 
support” for such a charge, which led to a “gross misapplication of the sentencing guidelines.”  

.                                                              
The Government filed its opposition to Alldredge’s motion on June 4, 2025.  Dkt. 46 
(“Opposition”).  On June 24, 2025, the Government purported to  serve Alldredge  with  its 
opposition papers, Dkt. 48, but Alldredge filed a letter with the Court on August 11, 2025, claiming 
that he had not received an opposition from the Government, Dkt. 7, No. 25 Civ. 1261 (JPC) 
(S.D.N.Y.).  The Court then ordered the Government to re-serve Alldredge on August 14, 2025, 
giving Alldredge thirty days from the date on which he was served to reply.  Dkt. 49.  Alldredge 
received service of the Government’s opposition on August 25, 2025, which rendered his reply 
due on September 24, 2025.  Dkts. 50, 51.  To date, Alldredge has not filed a reply.    

                    II.  Legal Standard                              
Under 

(a), a prisoner in custody for a federal sentence may move for his 
sentence to be vacated, set aside, or corrected on “the ground that the sentence was imposed in 
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction 
to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or 
is  otherwise  subject  to  collateral  attack.”    The  prisoner  may  gain  such  relief  “only  for  a 
constitutional error, a lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or an error of law or fact that 
constitutes ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’”  
United States v. Bokun, 

 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Hill v. United States, 

 (1962)); accord Lanier v. United States, Nos. 15 Cr. 537 (VEC), 23 Civ. 4939 (VEC), 

, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2024).  The Court must also “construe pro se pleadings 
liberally and interpret them ‘to raise the strongest arguments [that] they suggest.’”  Rahmankulov 
v. United States, Nos. 23 Civ. 3206 (RA), 20 Cr. 653 (RA), 

, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 8, 2023) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 

 (2d Cir. 2006)). 

In resolving a motion under Section 2255, the district court must hold a hearing “[u]nless 
the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to 
no relief.”  

(b); see also Gonzalez v. United States, 

 (2d Cir. 
2013).  “To warrant a hearing, the motion must set forth specific facts supported by competent 
evidence, raising detailed and controverted issues of fact that, if proved at a hearing, would entitle 
him to relief.”  Gonzalez, 

.  In this case, and for reasons that follow, the Court 
determines that “[t]he combined submissions of the parties provide a sufficient basis upon which 
to deny the [motion], and the Court concludes that a full testimonial evidentiary hearing would not 
offer any reasonable chance of altering its views on the facts alleged by” Alldredge.  Pinhasov v. 

United States, Nos. 16 Civ. 7349 (KBF), 14 Cr. 670 (KBF), 

, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 22, 2018) (citing Chang v. United States, 

 (2d Cir. 2001)).  An evidentiary 
hearing therefore is not necessary to resolve Alldredge’s motion.  See Camacho v. United States, 
Nos. 17 Civ. 1440 (KBF), 13 Cr. 58 (KBF), 

, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2018) 
(“[T]he petition raises no factual dispute and can thus be resolved without a Government response 
and/or hearing.”).                                                        
                     III.  Discussion                                
The Court first explains why all three of Alldredge’s alleged grounds for relief are waived, 
before explaining why, in any event, each fails on the merits.            
A.   Alldredge Waived His Collateral Attacks in the Plea Agreement.       
In his Plea Agreement, Alldredge expressly waived the grounds for relief he now pursues 
under Section 2255.  Specifically, he agreed that he would “not . . . bring a collateral challenge . . . 
under . . . Section 2255 . . . of any sentence within or below the Stipulated Guidelines Range of 30 
to 37 months’ imprisonment,” which—having been sentenced to thirty months’ imprisonment—

is exactly what he received.  Plea Agreement at 5.  Yet his first and third grounds for relief—based 
on the use of allegedly unconstitutional evidence and overcharging without factual support, 
respectively—specifically claim “an inflated sentencing guideline range and an unjust sentence.”  
Motion at 4, 7.  Alldredge further agreed to “waive[] the right” to Rule 16 discovery disclosures 
and to “not . . . attack [his] conviction or sentence, either on direct appeal or collaterally, on the 
ground  that  the  Government  has  failed  to  produce  any  such  information,  apart  from  any 
information establishing [his] factual innocence.”  Plea Agreement at 5.  But his second ground 
for relief specifically claims that the Government coercively “condition[ed] the continuation of 
negotiations on not having to turn over critical discovery documents,” which “pressured [him] into 

making an uninformed decision to accept the plea deal.”  Motion at 5.  And while that ground also 
mentions “threats of escalating charges and severe penalties,” 

 Alldredge not only agreed to a 
waiver applicable to the imposed term of imprisonment, but he also agreed not to “bring a collateral 
challenge  of  any  forfeiture  amount  or  restitution  amount  that  is  less  than  or  equal  to 
$2,552,432.13,” Plea Agreement at 5, which is the exact amount he ultimately was ordered to 
forfeit and slightly greater than the amount he was ordered to pay in restitution.  Alldredge’s 
collateral challenges, in short, run headlong into the express terms of the Plea Agreement, in which 
he agreed to waive such challenges.                                       
“A waiver of the right to collaterally attack a conviction is presumptively enforceable.”  
Cook v. United States, 

 (2d Cir. 2023).  Courts “will not enforce” a “plea 
agreement’s collateral-attack  waiver” in “only five circumstances”: “(1) where the waiver was not 
made  knowingly,  voluntarily,  and  competently;  (2)  where  the  sentence  was  based  on 
constitutionally impermissible factors, such as ethnic, racial, or other prohibited biases; (3) where 

the government breached the agreement containing the waiver; (4) where the district court failed 
to enunciate any rationale for the defendant’s sentence; and (5) where the waiver was unsupported 
by consideration.”  

 (citation modified).                    
Here,  Alldredge  does  not  argue  that  his  sentence  was  based  on  constitutionally 
impermissible factors, that the Government breached the Plea Agreement, or that this Court failed 
to articulate any rationale for his sentence.  While he gestures at having made “an uninformed 
decision to accept the plea deal” based on the Government not having to “turn over critical 
discovery documents,” Motion at 5, the Plea Agreement expressly contemplated that “if not for 
entering this plea of guilty, the Government would be required to produce Rule 16 material” and 

that Alldredge nevertheless “acknowledge[d] that [he] ha[d] not and w[ould] not receive such 
information because [he] ha[d] decided to plead guilty, waive[d] the right to this information, and 
agree[d] not to . . . attack [his] conviction or sentence . . . collaterally[] on the ground that the 
Government ha[d] failed to produce any such information,” Plea Agreement at 5.4  Nor does 
Alldredge’s allegation of “financial coercion” based on forfeiture hold sway, Motion at 19, as in 


4 While Alldredge did not waive challenging the Government’s non-disclosure of “any 
information establishing [Alldredge’s] factual innocence,” Plea Agreement at 5, he points to no 
withheld information that would help establish his factual innocence, instead raising the cursory 
argument that he had been “denied the opportunity to properly evaluate the evidence, including 
key documents that could have led to a dismissal or reduction in charges,” Motion at 19.   
the Plea Agreement he “also agree[d] not to . . . bring a collateral challenge of any forfeiture 
amount . . . that is less than or equal to $2,552,432.13,” Plea Agreement at 5.  
At his plea allocution, Alldredge acknowledged that no one had “threatened [him] or forced 
[him] to plead guilty or sign the agreement.”  Plea Tr. at 29:12-14; see also id. at 20:4-23:3 
(admitting the forfeiture allegation and acknowledging voluntarily signing the consent forfeiture 

order).  Such testimony, which was made under oath, id. at 5:7-9, “carries” a “strong presumption 
of  accuracy,”  and—in  the  absence  of  “a  substantial  reason  to  find  otherwise”—the  Court 
“discredit[s]” Alldredge’s “later self-serving and contradictory [assertion] as to whether [his] plea 
was knowingly and intelligently made.”  United States v. Juncal, 

 (2d Cir. 2001).  
Under these circumstances, then, Alldredge “knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the collateral 
attack waiver.”  Sanford v. United States, 

 (2d Cir. 2016) (per curiam); see also 
Garcia-Santos v. United States, 

 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (describing similar 
circumstances which supported the determination that the defendant’s “plea agreement was 
entered into knowingly and voluntarily, and with awareness of his waiver of appeal and collateral 

attack”).                                                                 
Alldredge’s collateral-attack waiver was also clearly supported by consideration.  A plea 
agreement is unsupported by consideration where the defendant “received no benefit from his plea 
beyond what he would have gotten by pleading guilty without an agreement.”  United States v. 
Lutchman, 

 (2d Cir. 2018).  Here, by contrast—and as the Government persuasively 
points out—Alldredge received three such benefits.  Opposition at 6-7.  First, by offering a guilty 
plea to the superseding Information, the Government changed Alldredge’s charge from a money-
laundering conspiracy in violation of 

(h) to one in violation of 

, 
reducing his sentencing exposure from twenty years to five years in prison.  Compare 

(a), with 

 § 371.  Second, the Guidelines offense level for a conviction under Section 371 
was four points lower than it arguably would have been for a conviction under Section 1956— 
given the inapplicability of two separate two-point enhancements to a Section 371 offense—which 
“reduced the Guidelines sentencing range to 30-to-37 months, rather than 46-to-57 months.”  
Opposition  at  6;  see  U.S.S.G.  § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B)  (two-level  increase  “[i]f  the  defendant  was 

convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956”); id. § 2S1.1(b)(3) (two-level increase where subsection 
(b)(2)(B) applies and “the offense involved sophisticated laundering”).  And third, the Government 
agreed to not seek forfeiture of the precious metals seized from Alldredge’s safety-deposit box.  
Compare Indictment ¶ 4, with Information ¶ 4.  Alldredge “undoubtedly secured considerable 
benefits from his agreement,” United States v. Rosa, 

 (2d Cir. 1997), and thus, 
having “secured the benefits of a plea agreement and knowingly and voluntarily waived the right” 
to collaterally attack his sentence, Alldredge should be held to his end of the Plea Agreement, 
United States v. Salcido-Contreras, 

 (2d Cir. 1993). In other words, “[a]llowing 
[Alldredge] to secure the benefits of the plea agreement while disclaiming its burdens would 

undermine the purpose of the plea-bargaining process.”  United States v. Jones, 

 
(2d Cir. 2024).                                                           
There is good reason why defendants lack the “right to bring a collateral attack when, in 
exchange for valid consideration, they executed binding plea agreements admitting their criminal 
conduct and waiving their ability to challenge the resulting convictions” and sentence.  Cook, 

.  Were it otherwise, “the plea bargaining process and the resulting agreement” would 
be rendered “meaningless.”  Salcido-Contreras, 

.  But “plea agreements can have 
extremely valuable benefits to both sides—most notably, the defendant gains reasonable certainty 
as to the extent of his liability and punishment, and the Government achieves a conviction without 
the expense and effort of proving the charges at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Rosa, 

; see generally Blackledge v. Allison, 

 (1977).  For this reason, “[s]uch 
waivers must be enforced” when they fall outside the “very circumscribed” “exceptions to the 
presumption of enforceability.”  Cook, 

 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
At bottom, where, as here, “the waiver itself is clear, unambiguous, knowingly and 

voluntarily entered, and supported by consideration—[like] the government’s agreement not to 
pursue charges or arguments that could have resulted in a much higher sentence—the terms of the 
plea agreement[] must be enforced.”  

.  Alldredge’s Section 2255 motion is dismissed for 
that reason alone.  See, e.g., Sanford, 

 (“[The defendant’s] collateral attack waiver 
therefore bars the present [Section 2255] motion because the waiver encompasses any challenge 
to his sentence.”).                                                       
B.   Alldredge’s Claims All Fail on the Merits.                           
Even were the Court to consider each of Alldredge’s waived claims—which it need not—
none would persuade.                                                      

1.  Ground One:  Violation  of  Alldredge’s  Fourth,  Fifth,  and  Sixth  Amendment 
  Rights                                                             

Alldredge first claims that he is “being held in violation of the Constitution . . . due to the 
unlawful search and seizure of [his] cell phones and private lock box, as well as the reliance on 
improperly obtained evidence and coerced statements during questioning.”  Motion at 15-16 
(alleging that “[t]hese actions violate[d] [his] Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights”).  This 
claim is squarely foreclosed by Alldredge’s guilty plea.  As the Supreme Court has long explained, 
“[w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the 
offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the 
deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”  Tollet v. 
Henderson, 

 (1973); accord Menna v. New York, 

, 62 n.2 (1975).  
Said otherwise, “a guilty plea conclusively establishes the factual predicate for the offense to which 
the defendant is pleading guilty,” meaning that “on collateral attack of a judgment of conviction,” 
a  habeas  “petitioner  may  not  assert  pre-plea  constitutional  violations  bearing  on  the  valid 
establishment of his factual guilt.”  United States v. Gregg, 

 (2d Cir. 2006) (per 

curiam).  So too here.  Indeed, during the allocution, Alldredge acknowledged that by pleading 
guilty he would be “giving up [his] right to seek suppression of any of the evidence against [him].”  
Plea Tr. at 14:4-13.  Having knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty, he cannot now challenge 
his conviction by raising pre-plea constitutional violations.  See Gregg, 

 (explaining 
that a guilty plea “conclusively resolves the question of factual guilt supporting the conviction, 
thereby rendering any antecedent constitutional violation bearing on factual guilt a non-issue”).       
Alldredge also argues that “the prosecution’s reliance on this unconstitutional evidence 
contributed to sentencing errors, resulting in an inflated sentencing guideline range and an unjust 
sentence.”  Motion at 15.  But that argument fails, too.  Under Second Circuit precedent, “district 

judges normally should consider illegally seized evidence at sentencing,” and may refuse to 
consider such evidence only upon “a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance 
a sentence.”  United States v. Tejada, 

 (2d Cir. 1992).  Even assuming that the 
Government’s evidence was unlawfully obtained,5 Alldredge makes no effort to show that the 
“evidence was seized expressly for the improper purpose of influencing the sentencing judge.”  

  
Nor could he: as the Government points out, the evidence in question was collected “more than 


5 The Government disputes that Alldredge’s “rights were violated” as to “the search of his 
cellphones and his interview with federal agents,” although it concedes that the evidence seized 
from his safety-deposit box was unlawfully obtained.  Opposition at 14 & n.3 (citing Snitko v. 
United States, 

 (9th Cir. 2024)).                            
two  years  before  he  was  arrested”—and  thus  three  years  before  his  sentencing—and  the 
Government conceded that if the case had proceeded to trial, it “would not have introduced” the 
sole category of evidence that was undisputedly seized illegally.  Opposition at 14 & n.3.  
Alldredge’s claim that the Court improperly considered illegally seized evidence at sentencing 
thus falls short.                                                         

2.  Ground Two: Prosecutorial Misconduct—Bad Faith Negotiations and Coercion 
Alldredge further claims that the “prosecution engaged in bad faith plea deal negotiations 
by intentionally conditioning the continuation of negotiations on not having to turn over critical 
discovery documents.”  Motion at 19-20.  According to Alldredge, such withholding—which was 
“compounded by threats of escalating charges and severe penalties”—“pressured [him] into 
making an uninformed decision to accept the plea deal.”  Id. at 19.       
First, there is no bad faith in requiring a defendant to waive his right to Rule 16 discovery 
in order to plead guilty.  “Of course, the more information the defendant has, the more aware he is 
of the likely consequences of a plea, waiver, or decision, and the wiser that decision will likely be.  

But the Constitution does not require the prosecutor to share all useful information with the 
defendant.”  United States v. Ruiz, 

 (2002).  It has thus long been standard 
practice to include a discovery waiver in plea agreements.  See, e.g., United States v. Barreras, 

, 118 n.1 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order); United States v. Nicholas, No. 20 Cr. 
224 (PMH), 

, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2025); Bonfiglio v. United States, No. 03 
Civ. 2983 (DLC), 

, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2003).  And here, the Plea 
Agreement specified that Alldredge could still seek to withdraw his plea or challenge it based on 
the Government’s failure to produce “any information establishing [his] factual innocence.”  Plea 
Agreement  at  5.    The  inclusion  of  that  important  “guilty-plea  safeguard[]”  shows  that  the 
Agreement was far from bad faith.  Ruiz, 

 (explaining that the inclusion of similar 
language in a plea agreement “diminishes the force of [the defendant’s] concern that . . . innocent 
individuals, accused of crimes, will plead guilty”); see also Opposition at 16 (explaining that 
“[d]espite this waiver, some discovery was produced”).                    
Second, there is nothing wrongfully coercive about escalating charges and severe penalties.  

As an initial matter, it is a basic tenet of the plea-negotiation process that “‘additional’ charges 
may be used to induce a defendant to plead guilty,” whether those “‘additional’ charges were 
obtained in the original indictment or merely threatened in plea negotiations and obtained once 
those negotiations broke down.”  United States v. Goodwin, 

, 372-80 & 378 n.10 
(1982) (emphasis omitted); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 

 (1978).  And here, that 
plainly legitimate practice did not even occur, as the original Indictment included a more punitive 
charge and forfeiture allegation than the superseding Information to which Alldredge pleaded 
guilty.  Compare Indictment (charging conspiracy to commit money laundering under 

(h), which carried a maximum penalty of twenty years, and including the safety-deposit 

box’s precious metals in the forfeiture allegation), with Information (charging conspiracy to 
commit money laundering under 

, which carried a maximum penalty of five years, 
and  excluding  the  safety-deposit  box’s  precious  metals  in  the  forfeiture  allegation).    The 
prosecution’s common and permissible conduct in seeking to persuade Alldredge to plead guilty 
provides no ground to alter his sentence.                                 
3.  Ground  Three:  Prosecutorial  Misconduct—Overzealous  Prosecution, 
  Overcharging, and Misrepresentation                                

Finally, Alldredge asserts that the “prosecution’s decision to charge [him] with conspiracy 
to commit money laundering under 

 was fundamentally flawed and represents 
overzealous prosecution” because the “essential elements required for a conspiracy charge—
namely, an agreement between two or more individuals—were entirely absent.”  Motion at 22-23.  
His support for that assertion is that he was “the only person charged in the indictment, and no 
evidence was presented of any co-defendant(s) or an agreement between [him] and another party 
to engage in criminal activity.”  

.  To the extent that Alldredge argues that he could not 
have committed conspiracy because his co-conspirators were not also charged, such an argument 

finds no support in the law.  And besides, any claim that his charge lacked “factual support,” 
Motion at 7, is completely undercut by his admission of the crime under oath in open court, see 
Plea Tr. at 29:25-30:16 (admitting to having “agreed with another person to conduct a financial 
transaction involving funds [he] understood to be proceeds of unlawful activity” and having 
“engage[d] in this activity with others who were also involved in the same scheme”).  A “counseled 
plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it 
quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case.”  Menna, 

 n.2; see also 
Juncal, 

 (noting an allocution’s “strong presumption of accuracy”).  The “factual 
predicate”  of  Alldredge’s  participation  in  a  conspiracy  to  commit  money  laundering  was 

“conclusively establishe[d]” by his admission of guilt.  Gregg, 

.    
                         *   *   *                                   
Having received substantial benefits—in terms of both possible time in prison and amount 
of forfeiture—from pleading guilty, Alldredge cannot now disclaim the associated burdens in 
doing so, whether because of his collateral-attack waiver or because his claims simply fail on the 
merits.                                                                   
                     IV.  Conclusion                                 
For the above reasons, Alldredge’s motion under Section 2255 is denied.  The Clerk of 
Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion at Docket Number 36, and to close case 
number 25 Civ. 1261 (JPC).  The Clerk of Court is also respectfully directed to send a copy of this 
Opinion and Order to Alldredge at FCI Lompoc II Satellite Camp, 3705 W. Farm Road, Lompoc, 
CA 93436.  A  certificate of appealability  shall not issue because Alldredge has  not made  a 
substantial showing of a denial of a federal right.  See Hoffler v. Bezio, 

 (2d Cir. 
2013); 

(c)(2).  The Court certifies under 

(a)(3) that any appeal 
from this Opinion and Order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis 
status is denied for the purpose of an appeal.  Cf Coppedge v. United States, 

, 444— 
45  (1962)  (holding  that  an  appellant  demonstrates  good  faith  when  seeking  review  of  a 
nonfrivolous issue). 
 SO ORDERED. 
Dated: October 14, 2025                           VtbfF_ 
 New York, New York                            JOHN P. CRONAN 
                                           United States District Judge 

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