Experimental. Doctrines is a new Annlex feature, starting with four areas: Self-incrimination, Brady, Terry and Miranda. Each page collects what courts have said about a leading case, quoted from the opinions that cite it. Annlex Chat uses these collections to help find relevant cases; what a case holds still comes from its opinion. We'd like to hear what's useful, missing or wrong: Send feedback
Bar on Impeachment by Post-Miranda Silence
Leading case
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)
How courts have described it
holding that prosecutors are prohibited from referring at trial to a defendant's invocation of Miranda rights for purposes of impeachment
United States v. Vinas, 910 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2018)
holding that a defendant’s silence after receiving Miranda warnings did not warrant a prosecutor’s attack on his credibility
State v. Mattson, 226 P.3d 482 (Haw. 2010)
holding that “the use for impeachment purposes of [defendants’] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” (footnote omitted)
State v. Muhammad, 868 A.2d 302 (N.J. 2005)
holding that use of post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes violates Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment
State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998)
holding that use of defendant’s silence “at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings” for impeachment purposes violated due-process clause of Fourteenth Amendment
Jeremy Howard v. State, 482 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. App. 2015)
Related doctrines
About this page
The quotations above are from court opinions that cite the leading case, in each court's own words. The heading is a short label Annlex generated from those quotations. It has not been reviewed by a lawyer and is not legal advice.