Miranda impeachment exception

Doctrine › Miranda

Leading case

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)

How courts have described it

holding that statements obtained in violation of Miranda, though excluded from the prosecution’s case-in-chief, may be used to impeach the defendant’s testimony if otherwise voluntary

United States v. Kristen Smith, 831 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2016)

holding that a statement made by a defendant to police in violation of Miranda is inadmissible as direct evidence but admissible for impeachment purposes

Marshall v. Randall, 719 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2013)

holding that unwarned statements are admissible for impeachment purposes unless an “officer’s conduct amount[ed] to an abuse,” in which case admissibility is governed by “the traditional standards for evaluating voluntariness and trustworthiness”

United States v. Khan Mohammed, 693 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2012)

holding that statements that were otherwise inadmissible due to a Miranda violation were admissible to impeach the defendant's trial testimony

United States v. Fnu Lnu, 653 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2011)

holding that voluntary statements obtained in violation of Miranda are admissible on cross-examination for purposes of impeachment

United States v. Eric Kevin Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 2005)

holding that statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be admitted for impeachment purposes

United States v. Sewn Newton, 369 F.3d 659 (2d Cir. 2004)

holding that statements obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment can be used for impeachment purposes

United States v. Thomas C. Hill, 60 F.3d 672 (10th Cir. 1995)

holding that statement obtained in violation of defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel was admissible to impeach a testifying defendant

United States v. Morel, 751 F. Supp. 2d 423 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)

holding that defendant's statement made without warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was inadmissible to prove guilt but admissible to impeach defendant's inconsistent testimony

State v. Gary Monroe Scull, 862 N.W.2d 562 (Wis. 2015)

holding that the prosecution may impeach a testifying criminal defendant with voluntary statements police obtained in violation of Miranda

Commonwealth v. Busanet, 54 A.3d 35 (Pa. 2012)

holding that statements elicited from defendant in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 LEd.2d 694 (1966

Qwest Services Corp. v. Blood, 252 P.3d 1071 (Colo. 2011)

holding that Miranda does not foreclose the use of an unwarned statement to impeach a defendant’s credibility if the statement was not coerced and given voluntárily

Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

holding that Miranda does not foreclose the use of an unwarned statement to impeach a defendant's credibility if the statement was not coerced and given voluntarily

Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

holding that a defendant's statement, made after invoking his right to counsel, was admissible to impeach defendant's testimony at trial, though not admissible on the State's direct case

State v. Sosinski, 750 A.2d 779 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)

holding that a statement made without a Miranda warning was admissible to impeach defendant's trial testimony

State v. Sosinski, 750 A.2d 779 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)

holding that defendant’s statement, made after he had invoked right to counsel, was admissible to impeach defendant’s testimony at trial, though not admissible on State’s direct case

State v. Jones, 705 A.2d 373 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998)

Related doctrines

• Bar on Impeachment by Post-Miranda Silence
• Cessation of interrogation upon invocation of Miranda rights

About this page

The quotations above are from court opinions that cite the leading case, in each court's own words. The heading is a short label Annlex generated from those quotations. It has not been reviewed by a lawyer and is not legal advice.